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S. 1 AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
THE PERSISTENCE OF DISCRETION
by Mary Ellen Gale*
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides
and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express
these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and
applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability.'
We must understand that crime is going to be with us forever . 2
I.
Much solemn nonsense has been written in the name of crime
prevention, crime eradication, and the deterrence of criminals. 3 But
there is nothing more indicative of our social and legal confusion about
the proper way to cope with the challenge of violent crime in a free
society than the history of capital punishment in the United States. We
have accepted it and rejected it and accepted it yet again.4  We have
sought for new ways to impose it,5 and new reasons to withhold it.6 We
* Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties 'Union of Southern California, Los
Angeles, Calif. Member of California and Virginia Bars.
1. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971). See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
2. Silver, Introduction to THE PRiSmEsNTS COMMSSION ON LAw ENFORCEmENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTiCE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocxT" 36 (1968).
3. See, e.g., Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 154 (H. Bedau ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as DEATH PENALTY IN AMERIcA];
Hoover, Statements in Favor of the Death Penalty, in DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA,
supra at 130. For Bedau's reply to Barzun see Bedau, Death as a Punishment, in DEATH
PENALTY m AMEmcA, supra at 214-28. For a cogent criticism of Hoover's remarks and of
the "confusion between the proposition that the death penalty deters and the proposition
that it is appropriate," see Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v.
Georgia, 1972 SuPREME CouRT REv. 1, 35-40.
4. See Cobin, Abolition and Restoration of the Death Penalty in Delaware, in DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 359; Dann, Abolition and Restoration of the
Death Penalty in Oregon, in DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 343; Guillot,
Abolition and Restoration of the Death Penalty in Missouri, in DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERCA, supra note 3, at 351.
5. See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter cited
as MODEL PENAL CODE]. See note 37 infra.
6. See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 645-51, 493 P.2d 880, 891-95, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 163-67, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (length of time between pronounce-
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have directed courts and juries to single out the wrongdoers most
deserving of the ultimate sanction and, at the same time, expressed a
profound and continuing distrust that they can or will do what we have
told them to do.
7
The primary purpose of this article is to examine one of the newest
and most complex schemes ever devised for inflicting capital punish-
ment on those who transgress our most cherished prohibitions: the
death penalty provisions included in Senate Bill 1, the Federal Criminal
Justice Reform Act, as reported last fall to the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary by its Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures.8
The primary argument will be that this latest attempt to rationalize the
death penalty, an attempt which plainly evidences hard work by its
drafters, is nonetheless a failure. It does not succeed in its announced
intent to compel courts and juries to act within narrowly defined limits
in determining whether certain criminals convicted of certain crimes
should suffer imprisonment or death. Still less does it point the way
toward any alternative scheme of sentencing which might remove
broad-ranging discretion from the factfinder's hands. The death
penalty sections of S. 1 are proof, if proof was needed, that it is im-
possible to remove discretion from our legal system, even in the name
of evenhanded justice.
11.
Nearly four years have passed since the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia,' struck
down the death penalty in the cases before it as cruel and unusual pun-
ishment forbidden by the eighth and fourteenth amendments.10 In the
interim, thirty-seven of the forty" states whose capital punishment stat-
ment of death sentence and actual execution is sufficient to constitute psychological
cruelty and thus violates California constitution's prohibition against cruel or unusual
punishment).
7. See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERCAN JuaR 448-49 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as KALvEN & ZEiSEL]; Note, You May Kill, But You Must Promise Not to Use
Discretion: Furman v. Georgia, 6 Loy. LA.L. REv. 526, 532-33 (1973).
8. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2401-03, 3726 (Comm. Print Aug. 15, 1975)
[hereinafter cited as S. 1].
9. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
10. The selective incorporation process, by which specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights have been assimilated piecemeal into the fourteenth amendment, now unquestion-
ably extends to the eighth amendment. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971)
(excessive bail); see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (cruel and
unusual punishment).
11. At the time Furman v. Georgia was decided, ten states had already abolished
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utes were thereby or subsequently invalidated have moved to restore
the death penalty in ways that allegedly do not violate the mandate of
Furman.12 Although no federal case involving the'death penalty has
since been up for review by the Court,13 there seems to be little doubt
that the pre-Furman death penalty provisions scattered throughout the
United States Code14 are unconstitutional under the ruling in Furman.
The death penalty sections of S. 1 are not the first attempt to restore
capital punishment to federal law. The Congress has already rejuve-
capital punishment. They were Alaska, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 385 n.7 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). California has since restored capital
punishment through a referendum, approved by a 2-1 majority. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,
1972, § 1, at 40, col. 3; see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27. Thirty-six other states presently
have provisions for capital punishment. 18 CRIM. L REP. 2196 (Nov. 26, 1975).
12. See text accompanying and following note 20 infra.
13. The statistics indicate that federal death penalties seldom have been imposed and
inflicted. Less than one percent of all the executions in the United States since 1930 were
for federal crimes. Bedau, The Courts, The Constitution and Capital Punishment, 1968
UTAI L R v. 201, 204. A total of 3,859 persons have been executed since 1930. The
last execution in the United States occurred in 1967. See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PuNIsH-
MENT: TElE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 11 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
BLACK]; U.S. DEP'T OF JusTicE, BUREAU OF PRISONS, NAT'L PRISONER STATISTICS, BuLL.
No. 45, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1930-1968, at 7 (1969). Last term the Court granted
certiorari and heard arguments in a death penalty case arising from North Carolina.
Fowler v. North Carolina, 419 U.S. 963 (1974). In addition, the Court has agreed to
hear arguments in five other cases arising from convictions in state courts. Proffitt v.
State, 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1090 (1976); Gregg v. State,
210 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 1974), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1090 (1976); State v. Roberfs-319
So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1091 (1976); State v. Woodson, 215
S.E.2d 607 (N.C. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1090 (1976); Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.
2d 934 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1090 (1976).
14. The Draft Committee Report accompanying S. 1 lists ten federal capital crimes
predating the Furman decision: 18 U.S.C. § 34 (1970) (destruction of motor vehicles or
motor vehicle facilities where death results); id. § 351 (assassination or kidnaping of a
member of Congress); id. § 794 (gathering or delivering defense information to
aid a foreign government), id. § 1111 (murder in the first degree within the spe-
cial maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States); id. § 1716 (causing
death of another by mailing injurious articles); id. § 1751 (kidnaping and murder
of President or Vice-President); id. § 2031 (rape within the special maritime or
territorial jurisdiction of the United States); id. § 2381 (treason); 49 U.S.C. §
1472(i) (1970) (aircraft piracy). See III STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON TEE 113-
DICLARY, REPORT ON CRIBINAL JusTIcE CODrIcATION, REVIsION, AND REFORm ACT OF
1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 909 (Comm. Print undated) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT
COMMITTEE REPORT]. Other federal crimes which carry a possible death sentence
include 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (1970) (train wrecking resulting in death); id. § 2113(e)
(bank robbery resulting in death or kidnaping). The federal kidnaping statute has
been amended to remove the death penalty as a possible punishment. Id. § 1201(1),
as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. II, 1972). This list does not include crimes punish-
able by death under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
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nated the death penalty in a narrow class of cases: those involving air
hijacking or air piracy.'-' The little-noticed but hotly debated Antihi-
jacking Act of 1974 was a rewrite of the capital punishment provisions
of the Nixon Administration's original version of S. 1.10 The death
penalty sections of the Antihijacking Act do not differ significantly from
those of S. 1; the arguments made in this article can readily be adapted
to any constitutional challenge to that statute as well.
The five justices who constituted the Furman majority agreed only
on a terse per curiam, of which the crucial sentence read:
The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 18
Courts and commentators necessarily directed their attention to the five
separate concurring opinions,' 9 and the four separate and combined dis-
sents, 20 in an effort to determine what the Supreme Court had decreed.
It was at once apparent that only Justices Brennan and Marshall had
concluded that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se, in all cir-
cumstances, as cruel and unusual punishment banned by the eighth
amendment. 
2 1
Justice Douglas found only that "these discretionary statutes are un-
constitutional in their operation. 22  Because the statutes before him
were "pregnant with discrimination" and discrimination had in fact
occurred, 23 they were not "compatible with the idea of equal protection
15. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1472(i)(1) (A) (Supp. 1976).
16. S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
17. Although the following argument is not framed in eighth amendment terminol-
ogy, it is clear that Furman, at the very least, forbids discretionary statutes which result
in the arbitrary and discriminatory application of the death penalty. Under a slightly
more expansive reading, Furman prohibits any capital statute which is discretionary on its
face, regardless of whether it leads to arbitrary or discriminatory results. Under a third
reading, any discretion, even if not accorded by statute to the judge or the jury, in any
part of the conviction or sentencing process, would be constitutionally fatal. See
Comment, The Supreme Judicial Court and the Death Penalty: The Effects of Judicial
Choice on Legislative Options, 54 B.U.L. Rav. 158, 162-66 (1974). "If what disturbed
the [Furman] Court was the exercise of discretion, then a statute that is mandatory on
its face but discretionary in its operation should not be a viable solution." Id. at 165.
18. 408 U.S. at 239-40 (emphasis added).
19. None of the concurring justices in Furman joined any other Justice's opinion.
20. All four dissenting Justices joined in the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. In addition, Justice Blackmun wrote a brief
separate dissent.
21. 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358-71 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
22. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 257, 249-52.
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of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punish-
ments."2 4 He specifically did not reach the question of whether a man-
datory death penalty, imposed impartially on rich and poor and Black
and White, would meet the constitutional commands.
25
Justice Stewart, expressly declining to rule on "[t]he constitutionality
of capital punishment in the abstract," determined that the particular
death sentences in question were unusual in that they were "among a
capriciously selected random handful. . . wantonly and. . . freakishly
imposed. ' 26 Since none of the statutes required death as an "automatic
punishment" for the crimes of which the defendants had been con-
victed, the death sentences exceeded the punishments the legislators
had found "necessary" and were thus cruel, as well as unusual.2 7  Jus-
tice White, observing that "statutes requiring the imposition of the
death penalty . . . would present quite different issues under the
Eighth Amendment," found that the statutes before him resulted in
death sentences too seldom to serve any legitimate social purpose.28
White noted that under the sentencing schemes at issue, "the legisla-
ture [did] not itself mandate the penalty in any particular class or kind
of case (that is, legislative will is not frustrated if the penalty is never
imposed) ....
Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined by the other three dissenters,
pounced on the White and Stewart opinions 0 as a guide to future death
penalty legislation. Burger observed:
It is concluded that petitioners' sentences must be set aside, not because
the punishment is impermissibly cruel, but because juries and judges
have failed to exercise their sentencing discretion in acceptable fashion.
. . . The decisive grievance of the opinions . . . is that the present
system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce
evenhanded justice; the problem is not that too few have been sentenced
to die, but that the selection process has followed no rational pattern
[I]t is clear that if state legislatures and the Congress wish to
maintain the availability of capital punishment, significant statutory
24. Id. at 257.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 308, 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 308, 309.
28. Id. at 310, 311-12 (White, I., concurring) (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 311.
30. Id. at 397-98 (Burger, C.J, dissenting). The Chief Justice's comments generally
are applicable to Justice Douglas's opinion as well.
1976]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
changes will have to be made. Since the two pivotal concurring opinions
turn on the assumption that the punishment of death is now meted out
in a random and unpredictable manner, legislative bodies may seek to
bring their laws into compliance with the Court's ruling by providing
standards for juries and judges to follow in determining the sentence in
capital cases or by more narrowly defining the crimes for which the
penalty is to be imposed.
31
III.
The drafters of the Judiciary Draft Committee Report on S. 1 relied
heavily on the language quoted above 2 to support their conclusion that
S. l's capital punishment provisions and procedures "meet the require-
ments of the Supreme Court by providing rational criteria for the
imposition of the death penalty which will prevent its use in an arbitrary
and capricious manner."
33
The report expressly rejected mandatory death penalties which
would preclude the exercise of any discretion by the sentencing author-
ity. Though such penalties might be authorized by Furman, the report
found that they could not "withstand the test of humanity. '3 4 Instead,
the drafters chose to establish criteria to serve as a guide in the discre-
tionary imposition of the penalty, elaborating upon the standards
originally adopted in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code 5
and suggested as an alternative in the final report of the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. 6
The Model Penal Code formulation, like S. 1, contains lists of
"aggravating" and "mitigating" circumstances which the sentencing
factfinder must consider and weigh in determining whether to sentence
a potential capital offender to death.17 Under the Model Penal Code,
however, the sentencing body retains the discretion to reject the death
penalty in any case before it, even if several of the aggravating and
31. Id. at 398-99, 400 (citations omitted).
32. DRAFr COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 910-11.
33. Id. at 911.
34. Id. at 918.
35. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 5, § 210.6.
36. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, FINAL REPORT,
provisional ch. 36, at 313-15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FNAL REPORT].
37. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 5, § 210.6, provides in part:
The determination whether sentence of death shall be imposed shall be in the dis-
cretion of the Court. In exercising such discretion, the Court shall take into ac-
count the aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3)
and (4) and any other facts that it deems relevant but shall not impose sentence
of death unless it finds one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsec-
[Vol. 9
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none of the mitigating factors are present. The drafters of S. 1 sought
to limit discretion further, observing that mere guidelines would not
guarantee an end to the wanton and freakish results deplored by Justice
Stewart, nor meet Justice White's objection to a system under which
the "legislative will is not frustrated if the penalty is never imposed." 8
As a result, S. 1 requires the death penalty if any one of the listed
aggravating circumstances and none of the mitigating circumstances are
present, but forbids the death penalty if any one of the mitigating cir-
cumstances is present (regardless of how many aggravating circum-
stances are also present)., 9 S. 1 thus combines ostensible standards
tion (3) and further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency.
(3) Aggravating Circumstances.
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an ac-
complice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing
or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force, arson,
burglary or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a law-
ful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting excep-
tional depravity.
(4) Mitigating Circumstances.
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or con-
sented to the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant be-
lieved to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person
and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
38. 408 U.S. at 311.
39. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2402(e); see DRAFT CoMMrrrnm REPORT, supra note 14, at
926. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances of S. 1 are contained in section
2401:
"(a) IN GEnNRAL.-Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a defendant
who has been found guilty of a Class A felony under section 1101 (Treason), 1111
(Sabotage), 1121 (Espionage), or 1601 (Murder), shall be sentenced to death
if:
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with allegedly mandatory aspects in an attempt "to maximize fairness in
"(1) the offense is under section 1101 (Treason), 1111 (Sabotage), or 1121
(Espionage) and:
"(A) the defendant has been convicted of another offense involving
treason, sabotage, or espionage, committed before the time of the offense,
for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was authorized by
statute;
"(B) the defendant, in the commission of the offense, knowingly cre-
ated a grave risk of substantial impairment of the national defense; or
"(C) the defendant, in the commission of the offense, knowingly cre-
ated a grave risk of death to any person; or
"(2) the offense is under section 1601 (Murder) and:
"(A) the defendant committed the offense during the commission of
an offense described in section 1101 (Treason), 1111 (Sabotage), 1121
(Espionage), 1313(a)(1) (Escape), 1621 (Kidnaping), 1631 (Aircraft
Hijacking), or 1701 (Arson);
"(B) the defendant has been convicted of another federal offense, or a
state offense involving the death of a person, committed either before or
at the time of the offense, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or
death was authorized;
"(C) the defendant has previously been convicted of two or more fed-
eral or state felonies, committed on different occasions before the time of
the offense, involving the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another
person;
"(D) the defendant, in the commission of the offense, knowingly cre-
ated a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of
the offense;
"(E) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner;
"(F) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by pay-
ment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value;
"(G) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the re-
ceipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or
"(H) the defendant committed the offense against:
"(i) the President, or a potential successor to the presidency as
defined in section 1359(a) (1) (C);
"(ii) the chief of state or head of government, or the political
equivalent, of a foreign power;
"(iii) a foreign dignitary who is in the United States on official
business; or
"(iv) a federal public servant who is a United States official, a
law enforcement officer, or an employee of an official detention
facility; or who is outside the United States for the purpose of per-
forming diplomatic duties or other official duties relating to the
functions of an embassy or consular post of the United States; and
who is killed while engaged in the performance of his official du-
ties, or because of an official action taken or to be taken or a legal
duty performed or to be performed by him, or because of his
status as a public servant.
"(b) IMPOsITION PREcLuED.-Notwithstanding the existence of one or more of
the factors set forth in subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2), the court shall not sentence
the defendant to death if, at the time of the offense:
"(1) the defendant was less than eighteen years old;
"(2) the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired, although
not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
"(3) the defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not
such duress as would constitute a defense to prosecution;
"(4) the defendant was an accomplice, the conduct constituting the offense
was principally the conduct of another person, and the defendant's participation
was relatively minor;
"(5) the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in
the course of the murder for which he was convicted would cause, or would
create a grave risk of causing, death to any person."
Id. §§ 2401(a)-(b) (italics deleted). Section 2402(d) provides for a special verdict as
to the existence of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in section 2401. Sec-
tion 2402(e) provides:
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individual cases and rationality in patterns of the imposition of the death
sentence nationwide.
' 40
The bill provides for a special verdict by the court or jury as to the
existence or nonexistence of each of the aggravating and mitigating
factors.41 The verdict is delivered following a special sentencing hear-
ing held after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty.42  The sen-
tencing proceeding is conducted either before the jury that determined
the defendant's guilt, before a jury specially impanelled for the sen-
tencing hearing if the trial jury is unavailable, or before the judge alone
if the defendant so requests and if the court and the Government
approve.
48
At the sentencing hearing, the court must disclose to the defendant
or defendant's counsel all material contained in the presentence report,
if one has been prepared, with one exception. The court need not dis-
close any material which it determines "is required to be withheld to
protect human life or to avoid impairment of the national defense.144
Information withheld from the defendant under the stated exception
shall not be considered by the factfinder in determining whether any
of the specified aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present.4r
Any information relevant to the existence or nonexistence of any of the
aggravating factors may be presented by either the Government or the
defendant, if it is admissible "under the rules governing the admission
of evidence at criminal trials."4  Any information relevant to the miti-
gating factors may be presented by either side, regardless of whether
it is admissible under the usual rules of evidence.47 Both sides "shall
be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the hear-
ing, and to present argument as to the adequacy of the information'
used to establish the existence of any of the aggravating or mitigating
"(e) SENTENCE.-If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds:
"(1) that one or more of the factors set forth in section 2401(a)(1) or
(a) (2) exists, and that none of the fators set forth in section 2401(b) exists,the court shall sentence the defendant to death;
"(2) that none of the factors set forth in section 2401(a) (1) or (a) (2) ex-
ists, or that one or more of the factors set forth in section 2401(b) exists, the
court shall not sentence the defendant to death but shall impose any other sen-
tenc authorized for a Class A felony under the provisions of section 2001."
Id. § 2402(e).
40. DRAFT ComMrE REPORT, supra note 14, at 919.
41. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2402(d).
42. Id. § 2402(a).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 2402(b).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
1976]
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circumstances.48 The Government carries the burden and must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any of the aggravating fac-
tors.49  The defendant carries the burden and must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the existence of any of the mitigating
factors, which "shall be liberally construed."' ' 0
Although S. 1 provides for appellate review of a death sentence if
the defendant files a timely appeal,"' the review is sharply limited in
scope. The appropriate federal court of appeals-after sifting the trial
evidence, any presentence report, information submitted during the
sentencing hearing, the procedures used at the hearing, and the sen-
tencing body's findings concerning aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances-determines whether (1) the sentencing hearing procedures
were "contrary to law" and (2) the findings relating to aggravating and
mitigating circumstances were "clearly erroneous."' 2 In making the sec-
ond determination, the appellate court must act with "regard for the op-
portunity of the jury, or if there was no jury, the district court, to ob-
serve the defendant."5 If the appellate court finds that the sentencing
procedures conformed to law or were contrary only in a manner consti-
tuting harmless error, and that the findings of specific circumstances
were not clearly erroneous or "were clearly erroneous but the sentence
was not affected," the court must affirm the death sentence.5 4 If the
court determines that the sentencing procedures were contrary to law,
and not harmless error, it must remand the case for resentencing under
the proper procedures.55 Only if the court determines that a finding of
the presence or absence of special circumstances was clearly erroneous,
"and that the sentence was affected by such finding," is it directed to
remand for imposition of"a sentence other than death."5"
Although the procedures outlined above for determining whether
to inflict capital punishment are undoubtedly more considerate of
human life than the old system of standardless discretion, it is equally
plain that they do not remove discretion from the death sentencing
process. Discretion under S. 1 begins with the selection of trial jury,
sentencing jury, or judge to hear the Government's case for and the de-
48. Id.
49. Id. § 2402(c).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 3726(a).
52. Id. §§ 3736(b), (c).
53. Id. § 3726(c) (2).
54. Id. § 3726(d) (1).
55. Id. § 3726(d) (2).
56. Id. § 3726(d) (3).
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fendant's case against capital punishment. Although the defendant ap-
parently is accorded the right under the statute to demand a jury for the
sentencing hearing, 57 there is no right to accept or reject the jury which
tried the case. The trial jury's availability for sentencing purposes is
governed by factors beyond the defendant's control. A defendant who
fears sentencing by a jury that failed to heed, for example, evidence
of self-defense, has no choice but to request sentencing by the judge.
Even then the defendant will have to accept sentencing by the trial jury
if the court or the Government does not approve the request.5" Since
no standards are set to govern the court's or the Government's decision
to accept or reject the defendant's request, that decision may be made
on a wholly arbitrary basis. It may be made for reasons which are dis-
criminatory or trivial, or both. Yet unless it is possible to say with cer-
tainty that the judge and the jury would have reached the same con-
clusion as to each possible aggravating or mitigating circumstance (or
that discrepancies in their findings would not have produced a dis-
crepancy in the ultimate sentence imposed), a standardless decision as
to whether to permit sentencing by the court instead of by the jury
may be the crucial factor in determining whether or not the defendant
is sentenced to death.5"
In the ordinary criminal case, such discretionary factors are perceived
as marginal and accepted as inevitable in a system of justice created
and operated by fallible human beings. But, as Professor Charles L.
Black, Jr. has persuasively argued, discretion used to impose the abso-
lute penalty of death must be closely confined, if discretion is to be
allowed at all."" The process that is due a man or a woman confront-
ing the possibility of execution is far more stringent than the process
owed to one who faces a small fine or -even a moderate prison sen-
tence."' Our system of constitutional law has long recognized that, as
Black notes,
requirements of fairness, certainty, and so on-all the things we mean
when we say "due process of law"--vary with the seriousness of the
57. See id. §§ 2402(a)(1), (2), (3).
58. Id. § 2402(a) (3).
59. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 436. In 21 of 111 potentially capital cases
studied, the judge and the jury disagreed on the death penalty. But the judge, not the
jury, was more likely to believe that capital punishment was justified. In 14 (two thirds)
of the cases where judge and jury disagreed on the penalty, the judge favored death. In
only seven (one third) of the cases in which there was disagreement, did the jury favor
death when the judge opposed it.
60. BLAcrK, supra note 13, at 32-36.
61. Id. at 32, 33-34.
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interest at stake, and that, as a corollary, imposition of the penalty of
death carries with it a more exacting requirement than other punitive
action of the political society.6 2
In recognition of that fact, the Supreme Court has upheld, against fed-
eral constitutional challenge, state laws which imposed stricter stand-
ards on trials in capital cases than in other cases. 63 Long before the
Court ruled that all indigent felony defendants were entitled to trial
lawyers at the state's expense,6 4 it held that the states must provide
adequate counsel for defendants in capital cases.65
Justice Powell, dissenting in Furman, attempted in part to answer
this argument by pointing out that the due process clause makes no dis-
tinction between deprivation of life and deprivation of liberty.60 "If
discriminatory impact renders capital punishment cruel and unusual,"
Powell deduced, "it likewise renders invalid most of the prescribed
penalties for crimes of violence." 67  But the due process clause also
makes no distinction between deprivation of property and deprivation
of life. The Supreme Court has held that property may be summarily
seized in certain emergencies where the public welfare imperatively
requires it.68  Using Powell's logic, the Court might permit summary
execution of dangerous individuals under certain circumstances. No
one seriously argues that we have yet reached the point where such
a holding is possible. Powell's argument, if it proves anything, proves
too much. The due process guarantee continues to require a painstak-
ing inquiry into the facts and circumstances and a serious attention to
the gravity of the loss involved in each particular case.60
62. Id. at 33.
63. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
64. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
65. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
66. 408 U.S. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (summary seizure
to protect public from misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947)
(summary seizure to protect against economic disaster of a bank failure); Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (summary seizure to collect the internal revenue of
the United States); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (summary
seizure to meet the needs of a national war effort); North American Cold Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (summary seizure to protect public from contaminated
food).
69. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (minimum due process
requirements not met in parole revocation hearing); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (civilian cook for United States Navy,
dismissed for failure to pass security requirements, was not denied due process).
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Just as standardless, uncontrolled discretion may enter the choice of
a sentencing authority, so too it may dictate the preparation or the fail-
ure to prepare a presentence report. Since no report is required by
the statute 70 the decision is apparently left up to either the court, which
could order the preparation of such a report, or to the Government.
Probably more important to the ultimate outcome, however, is the dis-
cretion expressly given to the trial court not to disclose any material
contained in the presentence report which -the court determines must
be withheld "to protect human life or to avoid impairment of the
national defense.
7 1
As clear as these guidelines may appear at first reading, they are
not matters which can be decided with unequivocal confidence. How is
a court to be sure whether disclosure of the source of information
unfavorable to a violence-prone defendant will endanger the infor-
mant's life? Can a court accurately determine whether failure to
disclose that information may deprive the defendant of leads to wit-
nesses that he needs in order to establish a mitigating circumstance and
to avoid the death sentence? Moreover, recent history has proved that
standards similar to "impairment of the national defense" are exceed-
ingly difficult to apply. Intensive litigation over the "national security"
exception to the Freedom of Information Act 72 demonstrates that rea-
sonable men and women-including judges-may differ over the
meaning of such terms. The executive branch of government has con-
sistently sought, though not always successfully, the broadest possible
definition of its authority to act beyond judicial control and without ac-
countability to individual defendants in matters relating to national se-
curity or national defense.
7
3
The Judiciary Draft Committee Report on S. 1 suggests that any
problems are solved by the further provision forbidding the sentencing
body to consider material withheld from the defendant when it deter-
mines the existence of any aggravating circumstance or the absence of
any mitigating circumstance. "Implicit in the language of this subsec-
tion," the report explains, "is the intention that if evidence tending to
establish one of the designated mitigating factors or tending to disprove
one of the aggravating factors is withheld from the defendant, the sen-
70. See S. 1, supra note 8, §§ 2402(b), 3726(b) (2).
71. Id. § 2402(b).
72. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. 1976). See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81
(1973).
73. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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tence of death shall not be imposed. '74  But since the court may not
always know what evidence the defendant could develop on the basis
of the evidence withheld, the implication is at best an expectation that
may be negated in practice. Since a sentencing jury presumably will
have no knowledge of material withheld from the defendant, it could
base a finding of an aggravating factor, or of the absence of a mitigat-
ing factor, on available evidence that is to some extent countered, or
altered in its relation to the circumstances, by evidence which is un-
available to the jury.
Similarly, the court's decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence
under the Federal Rules of Evidence inevitably require the exercise
of discretion. Although that discretion is channeled by formal rules,
it can be-and often has been-exercised in ways which are properly
characterized as "mistaken. '75  The Supreme Court has recognized in
several rulings that judicial mistakes concerning the admissibility of evi-
dence can constitute prejudicial error.7 6 This is; of course, a risk that
we run in every trial, criminal or civil. But how many of us are com-
fortable with the notion that a person may be executed because of such
a judicial error, insulated from review perhaps by an incompetent coun-
sel's failure to file a timely appeal or by an insufficiently indigent de-
fendant's inability to raise the funds for counsel on appeal?77
Although provision for appellate review offers an opportunity for
"correction" at a higher level of substantive and procedural mistakes
by the trial court, it again injects a substantial measure of discretion
into the sentencing process. Federal appellate courts are not always
internally consistent, nor do the eleven circuit courts of appeals
invariably decide similar (even virtually indistinguishable) issues of law
74. DRAFr COMMrTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 925.
75. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
76. E.g., id.; Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973). Many Supreme Court cases
have involved disputes over the scope and application of the exclusionary rule which
forbids admission of evidence in a criminal proceeding against the victim of an illegal
search and seizure, if such evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
77. See BLACK, supra note 13, at 85-89. Because adequate investigation and good
representation, at all stages of the criminal process from plea bargain through trial and
appellate review to clemency request, cost significant amounts of money, Black argues:
We are running a system, therefore, which from the beginning-from the hours and
days following arrest-so operates as to make it enormously more difficult for the
poor to bring out all the truth than it is for the well-to-do to bring out all the truth.
This is, of course, just another way of saying that both conviction and conviction
by mistake are from the beginning made much more likely for the poor.
Id. at 86.
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and fact in the same way.78 Although conflict between the circuits is
a major factor in influencing the Supreme Court to accept a petition
for certiorari, it is not compelling in every instance.79  Yet it is contrary
to our sense of justice as fairness8° -the treating of like cases in like
fashion, with due regard for irreducible individual differences-that
a man or woman should live or die on the basis of random selection
of a judicial panel. We take such chances, because under our present
legal system we must, when lesser stakes are involved. A deliberate
choice to accept those risks when death is the penalty at the very least
raises more serious questions about how far we want to trust the legal
process in translating difficult moral and legal distinctions from theory
into practice.
Such questions can only be sharpened by the limited scope of review
provided by S. 1. In particular, the "clearly erroneous" standard sets
a high threshold for appellate judges to surmount in overturning a death
sentence. Moreover, a court is required to affirm the sentence even
where the findings as to a specific factor are clearly in error, if "the
sentence was not affected." 81 The meaning of this section must be that
where two or more aggravating factors are found to justify the imposi-
,tion of death, an appellate determination that any (or all) of the fac-
tors exceeding the minimum of one was clearly unfounded is not suffi-
cient to reduce the penalty. 2 Yet it is not so easy to decide whether
78. E.g., compare Cleveland v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1975) (parolee im-
prisoned following new criminal conviction has right to prompt parole revocation hear-
ing), with Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1975) (parolee imprisoned fol-
lowing new criminal conviction has no right to prompt parole revocation hearing).
Both cases claimed to be observing the mandate of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
79. R. STERN & E. GREssmAN, SUPREME COURT PRAcTicn § 4.4, at 154-58 (4th ed.
1969). See Stem, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REV. 465
(1953).
80. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
81. S. 1, supra note 8, § 3726(d) (1) (B).
82. S. 1 provides no judicial review of an "erroneous" failure to impose a death
sentence. See id. § 3726(a). Thus, if no aggravating factors are found, or if any
mitigating factors are found, there is no appellate determination of whether such findings
were erroneous or not. Such a sentencing scheme is favorable to defendants who do not
receive the death penalty from the sentencing court. But it also maximizes the potential
for discretion and irrationality in the judge's or jury's manipulation of the aggravating
and mitigating factors. Since erroneous noncapital sentences are never reviewed, the
appellate courts have no opportunity to insure that the factors are applied the same way
in like cases.
We tend . . . to think of persons' [sic] being "clearly guilty" of crimes for which
they ought to die. Then some of them, by acts of pure grace, are spared-by prose-
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the sentencing body (judge or jury) was influenced in the finding of
one aggravating, and thus death-producing, factor by its findings as to
the other factors. The judge or jury may be far more certain about
the findings that the appellate court reverses than about the ones that
the court affirms. Had the jury known that its conclusions about some
factors were "clearly erroneous," it might have been unwilling to send
a defendant to his death on the basis of a factor about which the jurors
had substantial difficulty in making up their minds. Human decision-
making invariably involves such imponderable and largely hidden refer-
ents. To reiterate, we accept them in most situations because in the
real world, even the legal world, decisions must be made and must,
at some point, become final even when they are demonstrably "wrong"
according to the available sets of rules and principles by which we
measure them."3 Such mistakes become less acceptable as their results
become more serious.
Most crucial to the final disposition of the capital defendant's case
may be the discretion exercised by the sentencing body in making its
determinative findings of fact."' Such discretion is only amplified by
requirements as to the burden and the extent of proof. The "beyond
cutors' discretion, by jury leniency, by clemency. After all, who can complain at
not receiving a pure favor?...
The trouble is that the system may just as well be viewed, and with enormously
higher accuracy, if numbers count, must be viewed, as one in which a few people
are selected, without adequately shown or structured reason for their being selected,
to die.
BLACK, supra note 13, at 93.
83. Professor Black points out that "mistake" and "arbitrariness" are reciprocally
related. A decision is mistaken when it fails to follow established rules and guidelines;
for example, a defendant may have been "insane" according to the legal definition
although the jury found him sane. Black continues:
Secondly, there may either be no legal standards governing the making of the
choice, or the standards verbally set up by the legal system for the making of the
choice may be so vague, at least in part of their range, as to be only apparent stand-
ards, in truth furnishing no direction and leaving the actual choice quite arbitrary.
These two possibilities have an interesting (and, in the circumstances, tragic) re-lationship. The concept of mistake fades out as the standard grows more and more
vague and unintelligible ....
BLACK, supra note 13, at 19. The insanity defense, in all its various permutations, is a
good example of standards which are both exceedingly complex and, in places at least,
exceedingly vague. See id. at 50-55. See generally A. GoLDSTm, TH INsANiTY Da-
PENSE (1967) [hereinafter cited as GoLDSrEIN].
84. This discretion is practically impossible to control, since, in the sentencing stage
as in the trial stage, the processes by which the factfinder reaches its conclusions are
largely invisible. The history of mandatory capital punishment in the United States and
England is filled with examples of jury nullification, in which juries refused to convict
"palpably guilty men" because conviction carried an automatic death sentence. See
KALVEX & ZmSEL, supra note 7, at 435; Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital
Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U.L. REv. 32, 34 (1974).
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a reasonable doubt' standard is an ancient one, cemented into our legal
process. Yet fierce battles have raged over its meaning and specifi-
cally over the verbal formulations by which legislators and judges seek
to explain to the jury what the standard actually means.85 As Professor
Wigmore has observed: "The truth is that no one has yet invented or
discovered a mode of measurement for the intensity of human belief.
Hence there can be yet no successful method of communicating
intelligibly. a sound method of self-analysis for one's belief."88s  A
major study of American juries concluded that judges and juries differ
as to the intensity or amount of proof required by the standard, the
juries setting a higher threshold than the judges. 7 The "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard, though plainly less difficult to reach
than the "reasonable doubf' standard, is perhaps somewhat clearer: if
the facts piled onto the scales of justice .tip the defendant's way at all,
he wins. But even that standard is not free from doubt.88
The heavier burden placed upon the Government, to establish
aggravating factors by proof beyond a reasonable doubt while the
defendant need only prove mitigating factors by a preponderance of the
evidence, is unquestionably favorable to the defendant. As the Draft
Committee Report on S. 1 notes, it is "a further attempt to insure that
the punishment [of death] is not erroneously implemented."8 9  But it
is only an attempt. As the report's drafters realized, they are not deal-
ing with certainties. Although the statute provides that mitigating ele-
ments are to be "liberally construed," the report warns that this lan-
guage is meant only to "assure against erroneous application of the rule
of strict construction to limit improperly" the mitigating factors.9 0 The
report directs the sentencing body not "to avoid imposition of the
penalty where the terms of the statute would warrant imposition
85. See Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563 (1914); United States v. Moore, 435
F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); United States v. Cac-
chillo, 416 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1969).
86. 9 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2497, at 325 (3d ed. 1940).
87. KALvEN & ZEisEL, supra note 7, at 187.
88. Justice Harlan, concurring in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), noted that
"[tihe preponderance [of the evidence] test has been criticized, justifiably in my view,
when it is read as asking the trier of fact to weigh in some objective sense the quantity of
evidence submitted by each side rather than asking him to decide what he believes most
probably happened." Id. at 371 n.3. According to Harlan, the most sensible explana-
tion of the test is that it requires the trier of fact "to believe that the existence of a fact
is more probable than its nonexistence [in order to] find in favor of the party who has
the burden to persuade the trier of the fact's existence." Id. at 371-72.
89. DRAFT CouMwME REPORT, supra note 14, at 926.
90. Id.
1976]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
... ,"91 These terms are not quoted in an attempt to quibble with the
drafters of the statute or of the report. They are cited as an example
of the difficulties inherent in specifying the exact meaning of words in
context, even words like "liberally construed" or "strict construction"
which are, to some extent, legal terms of art. One wonders what the
term "strict construction" means to laypersons who have been in-
structed, or misinstructed, by the political branches of government in
recent years. And in this, as in other areas of the law noted above,
even judges do not always agree.
IV.
S. 1 provides for the death penalty in two classes of federal
cases: 92 national security offenses (treason,93 sabotage, 4 and espio-
nage95) and murder.96 If a national security offense is involved, the
defendant must be convicted of the most severe grade of that offense,
a "Class A felony" under S. l's terminology, before the death penalty
may be considered by the sentencing body.
97
A person is guilty of Class A treason under S. 1 "if, while owing
allegiance to the United States, he. . . adheres to the foreign enemies
of the United States and intentionally gives them aid and comfort
. . ,98 The drafters of S. 1 presumably believed that this historic
formulation 9 would preserve the limits of existing law, including the
necessity of an "intent to betray."'100 But the contours of existing law
are not entirely clear. During World War II, a federal district court
declared that even "[i]n times of peace it is treason for one of our
citizens to incite war against us."''1  Incitement, as a term and a con-
cept, has a long and checkered history in our constitutional law, par-
ticularly the law of the first amendment. 10 If so volatile and so cloudy
91. "Id.
92. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2401(a).
93. Id. § 1101.
94. Id. § 1111.
95. Id. § 1121.
96. Id. § 1601.
97. Id. § 2401(a).
98. Id. § 1101(a) (1). The violation of this section constitutes a Class A felony. Id.
§ 1101(c) (1).
99. See U.S. CoNsT. art. "M, § 3, cl. 1.
100. See Cramer v. United- States, 325 U.S. 1 (1944).
101. United States v. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. 738, 741-42 (E.D. Mich. 1943).
102. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450-57 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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an element may be introduced into the law of treason, the trial jury's
determination of guilt, before the sentencing stage is even reached,
may require the application of delicate, subtle, and elusive points of
law to a perhaps bewildering and contradictory array of facts. That,
of course, is what juries are for. But it is scarcely a situation in which
we can say with confidence that arbitrariness has been ruled out, or
that discretion can only be exercised within the closely confined limits
which even the drafters of S. 1 concede may be necessary in cases
where the death penalty may be imposed.
Nor is incitement the only potentially difficult point of law involved
in finding a person guilty of a Class A treason as defined by S. 1.
Shortly after World War II, two federal courts affirmed the guilt of
propaganda broadcasters as traitors.13 Such decisions cast doubt, per-
haps constitutional doubt, on the statutory formulation of treason. If
the statutory terms can encompass activities normally protected by the
free speech guarantee of the first amendment, the statute may well be
void for vagueness, or overbreadth, or both.104 In areas other than
national security, the Supreme Court has frequently declared that
criminal statutes which touch upon first amendment freedoms must be
written to forbid a narrow and specifically defined class of conduct
which genuinely endangers the public welfare.10 5
A person is guilty of sabotage under S. 1 "if, with intent to impair,
interfere with, or obstruct the ability of the United States or an associate
nation to prepare for or to engage in war or defense activities, he...
damages, tampers with, contaminates, defectively makes, or defectively
repairs. . . any property used in, or particularly suited for use in, the
national defense . "106 The property must be either owned by or
103. Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United
States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
104. See generally Amsterdam, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. RaV. 67 (1960). An unconstitutionally vague statute is one "which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application ... "
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Such a statute "violates the
first essential of due process of law." Id. See Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544,
545 (1971). An overbroad statute is one which sweeps within its prohibition both
conduct which may properly be made criminal and conduct which is protected by the
first amendment. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438 (1963); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
105. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
106. S. 1, supra note 8, § 1111(a).
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somehow under the care of the United States or an "associate nation' 07
or under construction, repair, manufacture, transport, or storage for the
United States or an associate nation.'05 Delivering such property can
also be sabotage. 10 9 In order to be a Class A offense, the sabotage
must be "committed in time of war" and damage or impair "a major
weapons system or a means of defense, warning or retaliation against
large scale attack. .... 10
Despite the complexity of its verbal formulation, sabotage looks at
first like a carefully defined crime. But S. 1 nowhere defines its central
concept, "war" or "in time of war." It is therefore not clear whether
sabotage committed during a war which was not declared by Con-
gress"' would be a Class A felony. Since neither the Vietnamese nor
the Korean war was ever declared by Congress, the determination
of the meaning of "war" is plainly a problem with real-world conse-
quences. Suppose further that the sabotage sections of S. 1 had been
in effect during the demonstrations against the war in Vietnam. Such
demonstrators might well have been found to have the requisite intent
to obstruct the United States' ability to engage in the war. Suppose
-that they somehow managed to scrawl obscenities on the walls of a mili-
tary facility designated for defense, warning, or retaliation against large
scale attack. Is that a proper case for the imposition of the death
penalty? Yet a jury or judge in the exercise of its discretion as a fact-
finder could (although it almost certainly would not) find the demon-
strator guilty of a Class A sabotage, punishable by death.
A person is guilty of espionage under S. 1 "if, knowing that national
defense information could be used to the prejudice of the safety or
interest of the United States, or to the advantage of a foreign power,"
he communicates such information to a foreign power, collects such
information "knowing that it may be communicated to a foreign power
.... ,1 2or enters a "restricted area!"" 3 with the intent to obtain such
107. S. 1 defines an "associate nation" as "a nation at war with a foreign power with
which the United States is at war." Id. § 111.
108. Id. §1111 (a) (1) (A).
109. Id. § 1111(a)(2).
110. Id. §1111(b)(1).
111. The United States Constitution grants Congress, not the President, the power to
declare war. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
112. S. 1 defines a "foreign power" broadly as "a foreign government, faction, party,
or military force, or persons purporting to act as such, whether or not recognized by the
United States" or "an international organization." S. 1, supra note 8, § 111.
113. S. 1 defines a "restricted area" as
an area of land, water, air, or space that includes a facility of the United States,
or a facility of a contractor or subcontractor working with or on behalf of the
United States, to which access is restricted pursuant to a statute or an executive
270 [Vol. 9
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information, knowing that it may be communicated to a foreign
power." 4  The offense is a Class A felony if committed "in time of
war or during a national defense emergency" or if the information
directly concerns major military weapons, major defense systems, war
plans, communications intelligence of cryptography, or if the informa-
tion is "restricted data."" 5
The espionage sections of S. 1 are open in many ways to constitu-
tional challenge. They are as potentially vague and overbroad as many
statutes which have been struck down by the Supreme Court for invad-
ing the territory protected by the first amendment. 1 6 Although
"national defense information" is defined primarily in relation to mili-
tary information," 7 its limits are not clear. It includes, among other
categories, information that "relates to . . . military capability of the
United States or of an associate nation ' " 8 and information that "relates
to. . . intelligence concerning a foreign power,"" 9 unless the informa-
tion "has previously been made available to the public pursuant to
authority of Congress or by the lawful act of a public servant ....
Under such broad terminology, newspapers which published
"leaked" information that United States troops were supplied with mal-
functioning rifles (no secret, of course, to the enemy)' 12 or that a presi-
dent or important military officer had displayed erratic behavior
122
order, or a regulation or rule issued pursuant thereto, for reasons of national de-
fense[.]
Id. § 1128(g).
114. Id. § 1121(a).
115. Id. § 1121(b)(1). "Restricted data" is defined in S. 1 by reference to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Id. § 1128(h). The Atomic Energy Act defines restricted
data as
all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2)
the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear mate-
rial in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed
from the Restricted Data category ....
42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1970). "Special nuclear material" is plutonium, enriched ura-
nium, and the like. Id. § 2014(aa).
116. See notes 104-05 supra.
117. See S. 1, supra note 8, § 1128(f).
118. Id. § 1128(f)(1).
119. Id. § 1128(f) (7).
120. Id. § 1128(f).
121. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 23, 1967, § 1, at 3, col. 6 (letter from marine stating
that United States troops died in battle because M-16 rifles jammed); id., Jan. 30, 1968,
§ 1, at 5, col. 1 (Secretary of Defense halts combat use of ammunition linked to jamming
of M-16 rifles).
122. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (senior Pentagon official
states that military leaders and Secretary of Defense closely monitored lines of military
command in last days of Nixon administration); id., Apr. 10, 1974, § 1, at 40, col. 1
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could be prosecuted for collecting national defense information, know-
ing that it may be "communicated" to a foreign power and that it could
be used to prejudice the nation's "safety or interest" or "to the advan-
tage" of some "foreign government, faction, party, or military force"
or some "international organization."' 2 3 Terms like "safety or interest"
are themselves open to a broad range of interpretation. Is it in our
national "interest" for the Government to conceal information about
our military deficiencies (or our military surfeits) from the public? Are
we more or less "safe" if we do or do not know about our Government's
methods of collecting intelligence data "concerning" a foreign power?
(Note that the definition is not restricted to intelligence gathering
abroad, but could apply equally to such actions as burglaries of the
homes within the United States of foreign visitors or their suspected
contacts among the American public.)
124
The problem with such broad statutory definitions is not limited to
the unreviewable discretion they accord to the trial jury in finding the
facts and relating them to the law. When a statute potentially reaches
a vast array of loosely-defined activities, it gives the prosecutor an
almost totally uncontrolled discretion to pick and choose among pro-
spective defendants. That, of course, is one of the traditional objec-
tions to vagueness and overbreadth in criminal statutes.
125 But it
applies with special force when the prosecutor's choice may eventually
result in the death of an individual whose mission was not to subvert
the Government or aid a genuine enemy, but to inform the public about
the issues with great impact on our national life.'
20
(editorial observes that Watergate incident has increasingly impinged on Nixon's ability
to conduct foreign policy).
123. S. 1, supra note 8, § 111.
124. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 8 (report describes allegedly illegal
Central Intelligence Agency activities within the United States since 1950's, including
break-ins, wiretaps, and surreptitious mail inspection).
125. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971).
126. The Government chose to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg, the distributor of the
Pentagon Papers, under 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1970), which forbids "unauthorized
possession" of national defense information or delivery of such information to "any
person not entitled to receive it .... " and 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970), proscribing unlaw-
ful conversion of "any record" of the United States to one's own use. See United States
v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1972). The maximum authorized penalty for each of-
fense is ten years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both. An attempt to prosecute Ells-
berg under 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1970), which carried a potential death penalty, at least
until Furman was decided in June, 1972, probably would have foundered on that section's
requirement of "intent or reason to believe that [the national defense information
communicated or delivered to a foreign government] is to be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation .. . " Id. (emphasis added). By
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The foregoing comments suggest some of the difficulties involved in
drafting statutes which draw clear lines between criminal and permis-
sible conduct, especially in so sensitive and political an area as national
security. Instead of seeking to overcome such difficulties by careful
draftsmanship, the drafters of S. 1 have reached out to encompass a
broad field of potential activity by persons who do not share the Gov-
ernment's perceptions about the national interest and who wish to
challenge its policies and programs.
Similarly, in listing the aggravating factors on which the sen-
tencing of a "Class A" spy, saboteur, or traitor would turn, S. 1 uses
language which is much too vague to give genuine guidance to the exer-
cise of discretion by the sentencing factfinder. The death penalty is
made mandatory where the defendant, in the commission of the
national security offense of which he has been found guilty, "knowingly
created a grave risk of substantial impairment of the national defense"
or "knowingly created a grave risk of death to any person ....
There is simply no convenient means to calibrate the gravity of risks,
so as to insure that independent decision-makers will invariably (or
even usually) arrive at the same conclusions. A "grave' risk is more
than a "light" risk or a "moderate" risk. But is it equal to or greater
than a "serious" risk? Does "grave" carry the connotation of "immi-
nene' or "clear and present"? Or doesn't it? S. 1 and the report do
not say.
Suppose a defendant, in the course of collecting "national defense
information!' carelessly throws a still-lighted match into a paper-filled
wastebasket in an empty office. Firefighters, called to quell the result-
ing blaze, run serious risks of injury. Did the defendant "knowingly
create a grave risk of death to any person"? Answering the question
comparison, S. l's espionage provision requires only knowledge that the information
could be used to the prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States or to the
advantage of a foreign power.
Moreover, section 794(a) requires communication or the attempted communication to
the foreign power. S. l's espionage section requires only collection of such information
(or entry into a restricted area with intent to collect such information), with knowledge
that it may be communicated to a foreign power. S. 1, supra note 8, §§ 1121(a) (2), (3).
Under present law, capital punishment is reserved for those spies who attempt to give the
information to a foreign power. Under S. 1, someone like Ellsberg, who simply reveals
national defense information to the public, could be prosecuted for espionage on the
grounds that he must have known that such information, once made public, might well be
communicated to a foreign power.
127. S. 1, supra note 8, §§ 2401(a) (1) (B), (C). The death penalty is also required if
the national security offender has previously been convicted of a separate act of treason,
sabotage, or espionage for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was authorized
bystatute. Id. § 2401(a)(1)(A).
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will inevitably require the sentencing judge or jury to entangle the truth
from a contradictory mass of evidence concerning intent, foreseeable
consequences, intensity of the risk, and the like. Does the outcome
have the requisite degree of certainty for a decision which may make
the difference between life and death? One can imagine similar diffi-
culties arising when a sentencing body is forced to struggle with the
exact nature of a "grave risk of substantial impairment of the national
defense." What is a "substantial" impairment, as opposed to an insub-
stantial one? Is national defense "impaired" if traffic to and from a
major defense facility is blocked for a few hours by antiwar demon-
strators? None of these questions have even reasonably clear answers.
V.
If the potentially capital offense is murder as defined by S. 1,128 a
new set of problems arises. S. 1 does not employ the common distinc-
tion between first- and second-degree murder.129  Instead, it defines
murder primarily as "engag[ing] in conduct that knowingly causes the
death of another person . . . ."1 Murder is also committed by
engaging "in conduct that causes the death of another person under cir-
cumstances in fact manifesting extreme indifference to human life,""'1
or by participating in one of several enumerated felonies during which
the offender or another participant "in fact causes the death" of a non-
participant in the felony."3 2
According to S. 1, a person's state of mind is knowing "with respect
to. . . his conduct if he is aware of the nature of his conduct. . .. ",31
He is "knowing' about an existing circumstance "if he is aware or
128. Id. § 1601.
129. The California formulations are typical: First-degree murder is the premeditated,
willful, and deliberate unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. It
also includes murder done by a destructive device or explosive, poison, lying in wait, or
torture or in an attempted or successful arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or lewd
and lascivious act against a child under the age of 14. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187, 189
(West 1970). All other unlawful killings of a human being with malice, but without
premeditation, are second-degree murder. See People v. Harmon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 308,
108 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1973).
130. S. 1, supra note 8, § 1601(a) (1). Federal jurisdiction over murder is limited to
murders occurring within the special territorial, maritime, or aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States, murders of United States officials and certain federal public servants
engaging in their official capacities, murders of foreign dignitaries, officials, and their
families, murders committed by mail, and murders which occur during commission of
certain federal felonies. Id. § 1601(e).
131. Id. § 1601 (a) (2).
132. Id. § 1601(a) (3).
133. Id. § 302(b) (1).
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believes that the circumstances exists ... ."" And he is "knowing"
about "a result of his conduct if he is aware or believes that his conduct
is substantially certain to cause the result."'
5
The first definition of "knowing" may smuggle in one of the ancient
tests for insanity (and thus, for non-culpability): if the actor thinks he
is peeling a banana when he flays his victim he is presumably not
"aware of the nature of his conduct."'13 6 Beyond such clear cases, how-
ever, it is difficult to see how the first kind of "knowing' will neces-
sarily limit the culpability of anyone who "in fact" produces the death
of another. 3 7  The third kind of "knowing," concerning the results of
one's conduct, requires belief in the substantial certainty of the result.
Such language seems reasonable, since nothing in this world is abso-
lutely certain. But where is the dividing line between a "moderate"
certainty and a "substantial" certainty? Can we rely on sentencers to
draw it in the same place on every occasion? Yet, if we cannot, it is
hard to justify capital punishment on the basis of such semantic predic-
tions.
The second kind of murder defined in S. 1 requires no particular
state of mind in relation to the circumstances under which the murder
is committed. If the circumstances "in fact" show "extreme indiffer-
ence to human life," that is enough to satisfy the statute. Presumably
such a definition is designed to avoid the difficulties of proving various
states of mind, without completely ignoring the general require-
ment of mens rea. 35 Even if we can accept the statutory framework,
134. Id. § 302(b) (2).
135. Id. § 302(b) (3).
136. In California the test has been stated as whether at the time of the offense the
defendant was suffering from "'such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of his act. . . ."' People v. Sturgess, 178 Cal. App. 2d
435, 441, 2 Cal. Rptr. 787, 791 (1960), quoting People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 39 n.1,
338 P.2d 416, 417 n.1 (1959); see People v. Berry, 44 Cal. 2d 426, 433, 282
P.2d 861, 865 (1955).
137. According to S. 1. "'in fact' means that the matter to which the phrase applies is
not a matter as to which a state of mind must be proved[.]" S. 1, supra note 8, § 111.
138. See id. §§ 303(a)(2), (b). In the traditional formulation, the existence of a
crime requires two essential elements: an act or omission prohibited by the criminal law
and a state of mind variously referred to as criminal intent, guilty knowledge, or mens
rea. See 17 CAL. JuR. 3d Crim. Law § 3. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952), in which a classic discussion of mens rea appears, the Court picturesquely
describes the requirement for a criminal .act as "concurrence of an evil-meaning mind
with an evil-doing hand. . . ." Id. at 251. When a person capable of criminal intent
commits an act prohibited as a crime, however, the law infers criminal intent from his
intent to do the prohibited act. See People v. Dillon, 199 Cal. 1, 7, 248 P. 230, 232
(1926). The Supreme Court has observed that most federal crimes require "proof of the
existence of a certain mental state .... The existence of a mens rea is the rule of,
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the notion of "extreme indifference" is fraught with problems similar
to those raised by the terms "grave risk" and "substantially certain."
Extreme indifference is a lot of indifference. But how much? And
how do we insure that the decision-maker interprets the terms in like
fashion in like cases? Appellate review which limits reversal to
"clearly erroneous" findings is not likely to add more than a modicum
of rationality and predictability. The rest is discretion.
The third kind of murder under S. 1 not only requires no particular
state of mind in relation to the possible results of one's conduct (other
than the state of mind necessary for conviction of the concomitant
felony), it does not even require personal action by the defendant at
all. This section combines the felony-murder rule and the vicarious
felony-murder rule doctrines which justly have been described as "the
harshest instance of strict liability in our criminal law."'139 Although
there is no unusual room for discretion, other than that inevitably
involved in factfindings about causes and effects, this section of S. 1
is open to serious challenge on policy grounds. The felony-murder rule
cannot and does not fulfill S. l's apparent purpose to single out the
worst criminal offenders for the death penalty.140  An "accidental" kill-
ing during a felony, especially when committed by someone other than
the defendant whose death is being considered, is not the moral equiva-
lent of a deliberate murder planned and carried out by the individual
whose fate is at stake.'
4'
S. 1 provides eight aggravating factors which, in the absence of a
mitigating factor, require imposition of the death sentence on a con-
victed murderer. The first of these is an extension of the felony-
murder rule, demanding death for the commission of a murder during
rather than the exception -to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence."
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). See also I. HALL, GENE.RAL PRIN-
iPLES OF CRimiNAL LAw 133-34 (2d ed. 1960):
The relevant ethical principle expressed in terms of mens rea, that penal liability
should be limited to the voluntary (intentional or reckless) commission of harms
forbidden by penal law, represents not only the perennial view of moral culpability,
but also the plain man's morality.
139. KALVEN & ZaisEL, supra note 7, at 442 n.12.
140. See DRAFT CommrrrEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 911, 916.
141. Justice Brennan, concurring in Furman, noted that the named petitioner's crime
was an accidental killing in the course of a felony, the Georgia Supreme Court having
accepted Furman's story that he tripped over a wire, causing his gun to go off. 408 U.S.
at 294 n.48. As Brennan wrote, if "Furman or his crime illustrates the 'extreme,' then
nearly all murderers and their murders are also 'extreme."' Id. at 294. See Note, You
May Kill, But You Must Promise Not to Use Discretion, 6 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 526, 531-33
(1973).
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ageespinag, esape142selected felonies-treason, sabotage, espionage, escape, kidnap-
ping,143 aircraft hijacking, 44 or arson. 45 The Draft Committee Report
explains that "[t]hese offenses are regarded as of such magnitude and
so inherently dangerous to life that, when coupled with the commission
of murder, they call for the imposition of the ultimate penalty."1 46 Yet
it is hard to see why either espionage, as broadly defined under S. 1,
or escape is more dangerous to life than, for instance, rape1 47 or maim-
ing14 -- offenses which are included in the general felony-murder pro-
vision but not in the list of death-provoking felonies. The section
suffers from the same policy difficulties as the felony-murder rule itself,
although it does limit or negate most of the sentencing factfinder's
discretion.
A second aggravating factor is conviction "of another federal offense,
or a state offense involving the death of a person," committed either
before or at the time of the murder for which the defendant has just
been convicted, if a sentence of either life imprisonment or death was
authorized for the other offense.1 49 This section requires the death
penalty for "the multiple murderer as well as the repeat murderer."1 59
It also reaches the federal offender convicted of any previous or con-
current Class A felony under S. 1.151 Since Class A felonies include
the three most serious national security offenses which, as previously
suggested, may by their terms be stretched to cover acts of political dis-
sent, this section potentially requires the death penalty for persons
whose "criminal record" is one of profound disagreement with the
government in power rather than one of uncorrectable recidivist vio-
lence.
The imposition of the death penalty in cases governed by the second
aggravating factor is a result, not of discretion exercised by the sen-
tencing authority, but of discretion exercised further up the line by two
trial juries (or judges). The first of the trial juries-the one which
convicted the defendant of the prior offense now used to justify imposi-
142. S. 1, supra note 8, § 1313(a) (1).
143. Id. § 1621.
144. Id. § 1631.
145. Id § 1701. The list of felonies is at id. § 2401 (a) (2) (A).
146. DRAFT CoMMrrrE REPORT, supra note 14, at 922.
147. S. 1, supra note 8, § 1631.
148. Id. § 1611.
149. Id. § 2401(a) (2) (B).
150. DRAFr CoMM irrn REPORT, supra note 14, at 922.
151. Under S. l's sentencing scheme, Class A felonies are all potentially punishable
by life imprisonment. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2301(b)(1).
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tion of the death penalty but which failed to prescribe capital punish-
ment at that time' 52-might not have convicted the defendant of such
a serious offense if it had understood that its actions would later be used
to inflict the death penalty. We can never be sure. Yet if we are not
sure, how can we say with certainty that this particular defendant is a
proper candidate for extinction?
A third aggravating factor is the defendant's previous conviction of
two or more federal or state felonies, committed on different occasions
before the -time of the murder at issue, and "involving the infliction of
serious bodily injury upon another person[.]" '" The report explains
that this factor is designed to punish with death the defendant whose
prior actions prove him to be "extremely dangerous to society.'"lz5
There is some empirical support for the proposition that such defend-
ants are more dangerous than others. At least one study has found
that, as James Q. Wilson succinctly put it, "most murders are merely
'successful' assaults.' 55  Typically in such encounters, anger, perhaps
exacerbated by a longstanding grievance, sexual jealousy, or alcohol,
flares into violence among people who already know one another.
Whether the assault becomes a murder often depends on whether a
weapon is readily available and, if so, what sort of weapon it is. "I
Access to emergency medical care may also determine whether the vic-
tim winds up among the assault or the murder statistics.5
Murderers with previous records are more likely to have a record
of assaults than of any other crime.158 Once such a violent person has
committed a murder and has been punished for it, however, the statisti-
cal correlation ends. It is a truism that murderers are the most successful
parolees, the offenders least likely to get into further trouble with the
152. Alternatively, the jury might have prescribed capital punishment which then was
not carried out for any one of a variety of reasons, such as commutation of the sentence
or abolition of the death penalty. In such cases, of course, the comment in the text is
irrelevant, since the original jury was willing to and did inflict the death sentence.
153. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2401(a) (2) (C).
154. DRAFr CoMMrIEE REPoRT, supra note 14, at 922.
155. J. WmSON, THnKING ABouT CRIME 194 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WILSON].
The study is reported in Zimring, The Medium is the Message, 1 J. LEAL STumns 97
(1973).
156. WmsoN, supra note 155, at 194.
157. Id. at 7. According to Wilson, in 1933 there were six times as many aggravated
assaults as homicides, but by 1960 the ratio had risen to 17 to one. See Wolfgang, A
Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide, in DEATH PENALTY IN AMERIcA, supra note
3, at 74, 80 [hereinafter cited as Wolfgang].
158. Wolfgang, supra note 157, at 82.
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law.159 The rational difficulty with the report's conclusion, therefore,
is that instead of focusing on pre-murder deterrence of the assaultive
defendant, it assigns the death penalty as punishment, at least in part,
for social conditions the offender is not directly responsible for (e.g.,
the ready availability of lethal weapons and the failure of most police
departments, prosecutors, and judges to treat non-murderous domestic
violence as a serious problem until it is too late).160 Also, under the
report's conclusion the offender is punished at a time when he is no
longer statistically likely to repeat his violence. Moreover, this aggra-
vating factor, like the one previously discussed, is infected with jury or
judicial discretion exercised in the past when it was not foreseeable that
a death sentence might ultimately result from a conviction. In any or
all of the prior cases, the jury may have been only marginally convinced
of the defendant's guilt. Though able to agree to a moderate punish-
ment, it might not have been willing to accept capital punishment as a
possible future consequence.
S. l's list of aggravating factors also includes the defendant who pays
for murder' 61 or murders for pay." 2 The latter category encompasses
murder to gain an inheritance or a reward. 6 3 Although such factors
are defined with relative clarity, they are subject to -the usual discretion
inherent in the finding of facts on the basis of contradictory evidence.
A sixth aggravating circumstance is the status of -the victim. S. 1
provides the death penalty for the murder of the President or a poten-
tial successor, the chief of state of a foreign power, "a foreign dignitary
who is in the United States on official business" or certain types of fed-
eral "public servants"' 64 including a federal diplomat abroad, "a United
States official,[ 65] a law enforcement officer, or an employee of an offi-
159. Bedau, Parole of Capital Offenders, Recidivism, and Life Imprisonment, in
DEATH PENALTY iN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 395.
160. See WiLsoN, supra note 155, at 194: "An assault arising out of a domestic
disturbance is likely to receive virtually no penalty under present circumstances."
161. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2401 (a) (2) (F).
162. Id. § 2401(a) (2) (G).
163. DRAFr CoMMrrE REPORT, supra note 14, at 922.
164. S. 1 defines a "public servant" as "an officer, employee, adviser, consultant, juror
or other person authorized to act for or on behalf of a government or serving a
government," including persons elected, nominated, or appointed to such positions. S. 1,
supra note 8, § 111.
165. S. 1 defines a "United States official" as
the President, the President-elect, the Vice-President, the Vice-President-elect, a
member of Congress, a member-elect of Congress, a Justice of the Supreme Court,
or a member of the executive branch of government of cabinet rank.
Id.
1976]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
cial detention facility. . who is killed while engaged in the perform-
ance of his official duties," or because of his official actions or status.'00
The Draft Committee Report explains that such persons were singled
out not because of any belief that their lives are more valuable than
the rest of ours, but because, "by virtue of the positions they hold, the
persons in the classes designated are today frequently the subject of
attack and assassination attempts. In view of their particular suscepti-
bility, it was felt that the full force of the deterrent effect of capital
punishment should be brought to bear in their defense."'
017
The report offers no. empirical evidence to support either of its
conclusions (that the classes named are more likely to be murdered
than others not named, or that capital punishment will deter those who
seek to kill certain kinds of public officials). It is virtually certain that
no such evidence exists.' 68 The list of special victims includes cabinet
officials, members of Congress, and Supreme Court Justices, yet the
166. Id. § 2401(a) (2) (H).
167. DRAFr CoM mirrEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 923.
168. The adducement of any evidence of general deterrence through capital punish-
ment statutes-much less deterrence of a specific class of potential murderers-is, to say
the least, problematic. Most scholars have concluded that the death penalty has no
deterrent effect. See, e.g., Campion, Does the Death Penalty Protect State Police?, in
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 301; A. C mus, REFLECTIONS ON THE
GUILLOTINE 8-10, 16-21 (1959); DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, "supra note 3, at 258-84;
Graves, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in California, in DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERimCA, supra note 3, at 322; THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMssION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIM IN A FREE SoCIETY, 352-53
(1968); Savitz, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in Philadelphia, in DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 315; Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and
Abolitionist States, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 135 (T. Sellin, ed. 1967); WILSON, supra
note 155, at 190-93; Bedau, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Reconsideration, 61 J.
CriM. L., Cim. & PoL. Sci. 539 (1970); Browning, The New Death Pendlty Statutes:
Perpetuating a Costly Myth, 9 GONZAGA L. REv. 651, 663-68 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Browning]; Glaser & Zeigler, Use of the Death Penalty v. Outrage at Murder, 20 CaME
& DELNQUENCY 333 (1974); Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v.
Georgia, 1972 SUPREm:E COURT REv. 1, 35. The only serious study which argues that
capital punishment is a significant deterrent is new and much disputed. Ehrlich, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON.
RFv. 397 (1975). Polsby, supra at 35-46, effectively demolishes the structure underlying
many arguments in favor of the death penalty, including remarks by the late J. Edgar
Hoover and several law enforcement officers, which are quoted with uncritical approval
in the Draft Committee Report on S. 1. DRAFr COMMInrEE REPORT, supra note 14, at
913-15. As Polsby observes, appeals to the "experience" of law enforcement officers are
no different in kind from arguments against the death penalty made on the basis of
statistics, since statistical data reflect "nothing but experience." Polsby, supra at 36
n.112. None of the law enforcement personnel quoted in the Draft Committee Report
on S. 1 provides any statistical or objective support for his belief in the deterrent effect
of capital punishment, The over-all tone is impressionistic and anecdotal.
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lower federal judiciary have also been the targets of violence or threats
because of their official actions. 1 69  In a democratic society, rating of
punishments by the victim's status seems peculiarly illegitimate, what-
ever the ostensible motive for doing so. 170 Most important in terms
of S. I's overall policy, this aggravating factor will do nothing to insure
that the "worst" criminals suffer the worst punishment. Under S. l's
sentencing scheme, the calculating killer of a child might be punished
with imprisonment while the impetuous killer of a federal law enforce-
ment officer or public official, absent mitigating circumstances, would
suffer death.
Although -the use of discretion appears to be limited under this
aggravating factor, the problems which do exist are ones which have
been difficult to resolve in other areas of the law. It is not clear in
many cases whether someone is performing official or private acts.1
71
Suppose a member of Congress is attacked and killed late one evening
while depositing a letter in a mailbox by persons who do not know the
victim's identity. Nine tenths of the letter is personal, but the last para-
graph concerns official business. Was he "engaged in the performance
of his official duties"? Should the difference between imprisonment
and death turn on the factfinder's answer to that question? Or suppose
that the beleaguered head of a foreign government flees to the United
States and announces that he is organizing a "government in exile."
He is thereafter murdered. He is clearly a "foreign dignitary" under
S. l's definition.'7 2 But was he "in -the United States on official
business"? Perhaps these examples seem unlikely. But life is more
bizarre than most legal hypothetical questions. The point is that even
the most seemingly precise terminology can become fuzzy around the
edges. When we condition a death sentence in advance on our
answers to questions which may turn out to be close ones in practice,
we are not removing either arbitrariness or discretion from the system
of choosing punishments.
169. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1967, § 1, at 34, col. 7 (bomb damages home of
mother of United States District Court Judge who issued several recent public school
integration rulings).
170. Cf. Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 13 Orim. L. REp. 3265,
3271 (1973).
171. A similar distinction as to the status of parties, and the corresponding legal
standard applied, often arises in the context of the official immunity doctrine, which
protects certain governmental officials from liability in tort. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306 (1973); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
172. &Ye S. 1, supra note 8, § 111,
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A seventh aggravating factor is the knowing creation of "a grave risk
of death" to another person in addition to the murder victim. The risk
must occur in the commission of the murder.'18 According to the Draft
Committee Report, this factor singles out the defendant who displays
"a callous disregard for human life, such as one who tossed a hand
grenade into a crowd of people[.]' 17 4 Although the example may
narrow the meaning of the terms to some extent, this factor is subject
to the same criticisms raised above in connection with the list of aggra-
vating circumstances which require imposition of the death penalty on
a national security offender.'
7 5
But the least clear of all the aggravating factors-as well as the most
emotionally charged-is the one providing mandatory death for a
murderer who "committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel,
or depraved manner[.]' The report's examples, which overlap to
some extent, are torture of the victim or intentional subjection of the
victim "to prolonged pain or fear[.]"'17  Terms like "heinous,"
"cruel," and "depraved" are almost without directive content. 7 8  The
word "heinous" has been used to describe crimes like possession or dis-
tribution of small amounts of marijuana or "certain sex acts between
consenting adults . . . [which] inflict no significant recognizable harm
upon society . ... I'll It is frequently employed to describe all crimes
which might 80 or do18' cost the victim his life. At least one state court,
173. Id. § 2401(a) (2) (D).
174. DRAFT CoMm-rEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 922.
175. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
176. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2401(a) (2) (E).
177. DRAFT CoMMrrrnn REPORT, supra note 14, at 922. The report's description of
"especially heinous" murders is reminiscent of Albert Camus' description of capital
punishment:
... [W]hat is capital punishment if not the most premeditated of murders, to
which no criminal act, no matter how calculated, can be compared? If there were
to be a real equivalence, the death penalty would have to be pronounced upon a
criminal who had forewarned his victim of the very moment he would put him to
a horrible death, and who, from that time on, had kept him confined at his own
discretion for a period of months. It is not in private life that one meets such mon-
sters.
A. CAMUs, REFLECTIONS ON ThE GUILLoTINE 25 (1959).
178. See Browning, supra note 168, at 702.
179. See Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment II: The Eighth Amend-
ment After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REv. 62, 65 (1972).
180. See Wheeler, Toward a Limited Theory of Capital Punishment: An Ex-
amination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838, 850 (1972). Wheeler
observes that "whereas horse-stealing was at one time sensibly considered an heinous
crime-one which might well cost the victim his life-that is no longer the case." Thus,
Wheeler appears to define a "heinous" crime as one which "might well" cost the victim
his life. On this definition, not only all murders but all aggravated assaults and many
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after describing a murder and a rape (two separate crimes by the same
defendant) as "brutal and heinous,"' 8 nonetheless strained to interpret
the death penalty statute in question as allowing the operation of discre-
tion by the sentencing court and therefore as invalid under Furman.
s88
Perhaps most instructive is the experience of Florida, which hastily
passed a new capital punishment statute within months of the Furman
decision.'" 4 The Supreme Court of Florida duly upheld its provisions;
among them one leaving the final choice of sentence to the judge, with
the jury giving non-binding advice, and another provision listing aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances similar -to those in S. 1.185 Com-
menting on the inclusion of "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel"
methods of murder in the list of aggravating circumstances, the court
observed:
To a layman, no capital crime might appear to be less than heinous,
but a trial judge with experience in the facts of criminality possesses the
requisite knowledge to balance the facts of the case against the standard
of criminal activity which can only be developed by involvement with
the trials of numerous defendants. Thus the inflamed emotions of the
jurors can no longer sentence a man to die; the sentence is viewed in
the light of judicial experience.'
8 6
In language similar to the S. 1 Draft Committee Report, the court
also rejected the notion that the words were too vague for evenhanded
application, even by judges:
[W]e feel that (the meaning of such terms is a matter of common knowl-
edge, so that an ordinary man would not have to guess at what was in-
tended. It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked
or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile;
and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter
indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others ...
[The terms apply to] additional acts as to set the crime apart from the
norm of capital -felonies-the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is
unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
187
(perhaps most) robberies and muggings are "heinous" crimes. S. 1 provides the death
penalty only for "especially heinous" murders. The word "especially" is obviously meant
to provide some restraint. But how much?
181. See THE PREsiDENT's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 352 (1968).
182. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 300 N.E.2d 439, 440 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1973).
183. See id. at 441-42.
184. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04, 921.141 (Supp. 1975).
185. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
186. Id. at 8.
187. Id. at 9.
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The majority ignored the warnings of dissenting Justice Ervin that
"too much discretion still remains in the jury in deciding what
recommendation to make and in the trial judge in deciding what
sentence to impose."'188
Two years later, in Slater v. State,8 ' the Florida Supreme Court
overturned a death sentence imposed under the new statute on the
grounds that it denied "equal justice" to the defendant, an accomplice
in a robbery during which another robber killed the victim. The court
noted that the "triggerman" had pleaded no contest to a first-degree
murder charge and had been sentenced to life imprisonment. The
defendant, who had insisted on going to trial, was sentenced to death
by the trial judge, despite the jury's eleven-to-one recommendation of
life imprisonment. In his written statement of reasons for imposing the
death penalty, the trial judge explained that the defendant had "killed
a man for $64.88 . . . in an act that was imminently dangerous to an
unknown number of people. It was only chance that there was only
one man in the room at that time." In order to fulfill the criterion of
heinousness, the judge continued, "I don't think you have to have a
messy crime. I think it is a heinous and atrocious act to ever threaten
a man just to take his money or his property.
'l19
Despite specific guidance from the state's highest court, the trial
judge in Slater selected the death penalty, in what appears to have been
a drearily ordinary felony-murder, for an accomplice who was not
directly responsible for the killing. The judge's written statement of
reasons evidences his belief that nearly any violent murder committed
in any place where more than one person might well be found would
constitute a grave risk of death to someone other than the murder vic-
tim. The judge also declared that it is "heinous and atrocious," within
the meaning of the capital punishment statute, for any person to
threaten another person in hope of pecuniary gain. Under this reading
of the supposed standard, all muggers and robbers would deserve the
death penalty.'
9 '
188. Id. at 15 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
189. 316So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975).
190. Id. at 542.
191. A June 1973 Harris poll found that eight percent of those questioned were in
favor of an automatic death penalty for all bank robbers; nine percent favored an auto-
matic death sentence for convicted muggers. Vidmar & ,Ellsworth, Public Opinion and
the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. R V. 1245, 1252 (1974). By comparison, 41 percent
approved an automatic death penalty for all killers of policemen or prison guards, 28
percent approved of mandatory capital punishment for all first-degree murderers, 27 per-
cent wanted it for all skyjackers, and 19 percent favored death for all rapists. Vidmar
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In reversing the trial judge, the Supreme Court of Florida did not
even suggest that there was any discrepancy between the trial judge's
reading of the statute and its own reading.' 92  Instead, it invoked
notions of equal protection in ruling that since the triggerman was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment, "equal justice" was denied when the
accomplice was sentenced to death. We are left to wonder whether
the Florida Supreme Court would have upheld the death penalty for
the accomplice if it had been prescribed for the triggerman, despite the
accomplice's lack of intentional participation in the murder.
19 3
It should also be noted that the court's opinion does not criticize or
even comment on the trial judge's willingness to withhold the death
penalty for a defendant who pleads guilty while imposing it on a less
culpable co-defendant who exercises his right to jury trial. Yet nothing
in the Florida statute suggests that demanding a trial is to be considered
an "aggravating factor" when the time comes to select an appropriate
sentence, or that foregoing a trial is to be considered a "mitigating fac-
tor." If the statute were so phrased, it would plainly be unconstitu-
tional.'0 4  The fact pattern at least indicates that the trial judge, exer-
cising his discretion, applied the statute in Slater to reward the coopera-
tive defendant and punish the recalcitrant one-regardless of their
relative degrees of culpability and regardless of statutory guidelines
which had been elaborated at length in the state supreme court's earlier
opinion.
The trial jury in the Slater case, instead of acting on "inflamed
emotions" as the Florida Supreme Court had in general predicted,
responded more calmly than the trial judge. But the most extensive
and Ellsworth, apparently assuming that all those who approved of mandatory capital
punishment for lesser crimes also approved of it for greater crimes, observe that one
fourth or more of the people who endorse capital punishment for serious crimes like
murder, rape, and skyjacking, also
would apply it in circumstances where it clearly must be considered an excessive
punishment for the crime committed. One is tempted to ask whether these persons
have socio-legal attitudes that are out of step with contemporary values concerning
criminal justice.
Id. at 1252 n.36.
192. See Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975).
193. The accomplice's culpability in Slater seems roughly comparable to the petition-
er's culpability in Furman. If Furman's case was not "extreme," neither was Slater's. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
194. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (the fifth amendment right
not to plead guilty and the sixth amendment right to jury trial forbid the establishment of
a death penalty applicable only to those defendants who assert their right to contest their
guilt before a jury); Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 543 (Fla. 1975) (Crews, C.1., con-
curring).
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study of American juries ever undertaken concluded that neither judges
nor juries exercise their discretion in evenhanded fashion when select-
ing from among the many convicted of capital crimes the few who are to
die.195 In The American Jury, Professors Kalven and Zeisel reported
on 111 cases in which the judge or the jury found the defendant guilty
of a capital crime and could have imposed a death penalty.190 In 68
percent of these cases (76 cases), the judge and the jury agreed on
a sentence other than death. 97 In 13 percent (14 cases) the judge
and the jury agreed on the death penalty. In another 13 percent (14
cases) the jury was "lenient,' 91 8 but the judge would have sentenced
the defendant to death. And in six percent (seven cases) the judge was
lenient, but the jury inflicted the death sentence. Thus the judge and
the jury disagreed in nearly one out of five (19 percent) of the
cases.' 99 Contrary to the impressions of the Supreme Court of Florida
in State v. Dixon, 2 0  and in accord with the actual results in Slater v.
State,2 01 the judge is more ready to inflict capital punishment (26 per-
cent of the cases) than is the jury (19 percent of the cases).
Kalven and Zeisel initially observed that the cases in which the
judge and jury agree on the death penalty "are marked for the most
part by peculiar heinousness. In many, a clear pattern emerges; there
is an aspect of almost gratuitous violence.12 0 2  Other characteristics are
"patent defenselessness of the victim" and "special ugliness in the tools
of a murder with sexual overtones."208 Five of the cases involve mul-
195. KALvEN & ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 437-49.
196. Id. at 435. The 111 capital cases were drawn from a total sample of 3,576 cases.
Id. at 33.
197. Id. at 436. Kalven and Zeisel's study measured the performance of the jury
against the performance of the judge in each case by comparing the actual decision of the
jury with a report from the trial judge, telling how he would have disposed of that case
had it been tried before him without a jury. Id. at 10.
198. Kalven and Zeisel note that the explanation given by the judge is usually put in
terms of "leniency-disposing factors. Moreover, historically, the problem was developed
as one of making exceptions to the death penalty." Id. at 439 n.10. Compare BLACK,
supra note 13, at 93:
We tend ... to think of persons' [sic] being "clearly guilty" of crimes for which
they ought to die. Then some of them, by acts of pure grace, are spared-by prose-
cutors' discretion, by jury leniency, by clemency....
...The inevitable corollary of sparing some people through mere grace or favor
is standardless condemnation of others. The thing that ought to impress us is the
standardless condemnation; we have been looking too long at its mirror image; we
should take courage and turn around.
199. KALvEN & Z ISEL, supra note 7, at 436.
200. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
201. 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975).
202. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 437.
203. Id.
286 [Vol. 9
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tiple victims; three involve brutal physical mistreatment of wholly inno-
cent victims (an elderly couple in one case, an elderly man in another,
a four-and-one-half-year-old child in the third). Some of the other
cases of judge-jury agreement on the death penalty are poignantly
horrible: a man murders his whole family, a defendant refused credit
returns and shoots a 72 year-old grocer in the back, an elderly truck
driver is murdered by a helper who steals the receipts on the driver's
last trip before retirement. If that were all the information available,
it would offer some support for "heinousness" as an aggravating factor
which singles out those killers who most deserve to die. But that is
not all.
Though the cases of judge-jury agreement at first seem to have "a
strong sense of unity" and involve "especially vicious" premeditated
killings, Kalven and Zeisel point out that
some aspects of this viciousness verge so much on the clearly pathologi-
cal that the criterion loses some of its usefulness. Moreover. . .many
of the murder cases in which the judge and jury disagree on the death
penalty appear no less heinous than those in which they agree.
2 04
Once again, discretion is being (or would be) exercised in ways not
predictable from comparisons of the factual situations involved.
In one case a 22 year-old inmate of an institution for defective delin-
quents kills an aged guard without provocation. The judge would have
given the death penalty; the jury was lenient. The jury is also lenient
and the judge stern, with a defendant who killed a woman he claimed
to love, turned himself over to the police asking for immediate execu-
tion, and unsuccessfully pleaded insanity at his trial. But in a third
case, where a defendant shot a gas station owner and his wife to death,
the situation is reversed. The jury gives the death penalty; the judge
would have been lenient, explaining that the defendant was provoked
to fury when the station owner told him, "you damn niggers get the
hell out of here."205 Kalven and Zeisel comment:
The judge who, unlike the jury, did not respond to the touch of insanity
in the first two cases, does accept this sudden anger as a sufficient reason
for withholding the death penalty. And the jury, sensitive to the
marginal responsibility in the previous cases, is deaf to the wild anger
in this one.2
0 6
The overtones of racism in the foregoing case reappear in another form
in a case in which a black defendant kills his lover. The jury is leni-
204. Id. at 438-39 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 440.
206. Id.
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ent. The judge, who would have sentenced to death, suggests that
the jury is sympathetic to the defendant's jealousy and adds: "A Negro
killing a Negro, that is, the jury did not attach enough importance to
the value of a human life due to race.)
20 7
The peculiarities of American sexism also trace a recognizable
thread through the cases. A jury convicts a husband and wife of second-
degree murder when their beating of their four year-old child causes
the child's death; the judge would have given the death penalty.
Kalven and Zeisel speculate that in the case of the wife the jury "may
have been following its special form of chivalry in not imposing the
death penalty on a woman,"208 and may have then treated the partners
equally. In another case, a man kills a woman "of poor reputation."
The jury is stem, the judge lenient on the grounds that "the victim was
herself an underworld character and was guilty at least of keeping com-
pany with a person of defendant's reputation .. .20
In two cases the judge would not have sentenced the defendant to
death, although the jury did, if the defendant had agreed to a bench
rather than a jury trial. As may have been the case with the co-felon
in Slater, the judges in these two cases view waiver of jury trial as "a
gesture of cooperation warranting withholding the death penalty. '210
Kalven and Zeisel also note that the jury rebels at the felony-murder
rule where intent is unclear, both in the child-beating case and in one
where (as in Slater v. State) the jury withholds but the judge gives the
death penalty to a defendant who is only vicariously responsible for the
killing.2
11
Summarizing the leniency disposing factors in the cases of judge-jury
disagreement, Kalven and Zeisel found two cases in which diminished
responsibility was a factor; eight involving provocation, anger, or
jealousy; two involving a "worthless victim"; seven involving a felony-
murder in which the other felons had not been sentenced to death and
207. Id. at 442.
208. Id. Justice Marshall, concurring in Furman, noted that the death penalty
appears to have been employed in a discriminatory fashion not only against Blacks but
also against men as compared to women. 408 U.S. at 365. Although statistics collected
some years ago indicated that men kill between four and five times more frequently than
women (see Wolfgang, supra note 157, at 75), from 1930 to 1968 only 32 women were
executed in comparison with 3,827 men. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, BUREAU OF PRISONS,
NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, BULL. No. 45, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1930-1968, at 28
(1969).
209. KALVEN & ZEiSEL, supra note 7, at 443.
210. Id. at 444.
211. Id. at 443.
[Vol. 9
S. 1 AND THE DEATH PENALTY
four felony-murders in which the defendant was not the killer; two
involving a woman defendant; and one in which defense counsel was
incompetent (thus disposing the judge to be lenient).212 As the study's
authors note, this list makes the "discretionary allocation" of capital
punishment seem somewhat regular, but each time one of the listed fac-
tors persuaded one of the deciders (judge or jury) to withhold death,
the other was unpersuaded. "Either the judge or the jury was willing,
despite the presence of the leniency-disposing factor, to have the
defendant executed."
213
Kalven and Zeisel express a concern for evenhanded justice even
after expected procedural reforms are introduced into the sentencing
process. As they put it:
In the end the task is one of deciding who, among those convicted of
capital crimes, is to die. Whatever the differences on which this deci-
sion hinges, they remain demeaningly trivial compared to the stakes.
The discretionary use of the death penalty requires a decision which no
human should be called upon to make.
214
At the very least, their study makes it clear that the constellation of
factors involved in the choice of sentence is not easily confined by verbal
formulations. Even when compressed into one- or two-sentence outlines,
the cases discussed above suggest that very delicate shadings of fact,
perception, emotion, and bias determine the ultimate results. Judge
and jury manipulate the idea of "heinousness" according to standards
and beliefs that the law cannot control by statutory prescription-or,
probably, at all. But then capital punishment can never be made
"mandatory" or discretion channeled so as to remove all arbitrariness
in decision-making. We are stuck (as most of us probably suspected)
with an imperfect and imperfectable world.21 5
212. Id. at 445. The list given here does not include all the factors noted by Kalven
and Zeisel.
213. Id. at 444.
214. Id. at 448-49 (footnote omitted).
215. See Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in Criminal Justice, 46 S. CAL. L.
REv. 12 (1972). Rosett believes that discretion, defined both as the absence of
controlling standards and the opportunity for uncontrolled deviation from any governing
norm, is an inevitable part of the criminal justice system because, "not much can be done
about the imprecision of words, the need to accommodate to individual circumstances, or
the inability to resolve policy differences." Id. at 30. He recommends instead that
we ameliorate the system's "tendency to act with greatly differential severity" and to
inflict overly severe punishments:
If punishment is less catastrophic it ceases to be an unmentionable dirty word and
can be calmly assessed in fundtional terms.. . . A system in which the formal
punishments for crime were less severe might be less dependent on discretionary es-
capes from its own stated rules.
Id. at 30.
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VI.
S. 1 lists five mitigating factors which preclude the imposition of the
death sentence on a defendant, regardless of whether the sentencing
body has found one or more of the aggravating factors to exist.
210
The factors apply both to national security offenders and murder-
ers. The Draft Committee Report describes them all as circum-
stances which, though not justifying murder, nonetheless indicate a
lesser degree of moral culpability. According to the report, the miti-
gating factors
are deliberately drawn broadly enough to cover every foreseeable factor
that might justify prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in a
particular case. At the same time they are specific enough to avoid the
wanton and freakish results that the Furman decision stated were uncon-
stitutional. 2
1 7
Only one of the five mitigating factors precludes the exercise of
discretion by the sentencing body: the one which forbids the death
sentence if the defendant was less than 18 years old at the time of the
offense. 218  The other four all involve the complex weighing of factual
evidence, and the sorting out of delicate legal differentials, which are
the hallmark of discretion.
The first of these four discretionary factors precludes a death sen-
tence for a defendant if, at the time of his otherwise capital offense,
his "mental capacity was significantly impaired, although not so im-
paired, as to constitute a defense to prosecution[.]2 219 The report
describes such a defendant as one who is "legally sane and responsible
for his actions" but nonetheless suffers "a significant mental impair-
ment. ' 220 The impairment "can be ongoing or chronic, as a result of
mental disease or defect, but it need not be.122 1 The report continues:
A particular set of circumstances, such as serious intoxication or a heavy
blow upon the head, might well give rise to a sudden mental impair-
ment. As long as this resulted in a "significant" impairment of the de-
fendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law, he would come within the
scope of the provision.
222
216. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2401(b).
217. DRAFT CoMMrIE REPoRT, supra note 14, at 923.
218. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2401(b)(1).
219. Id. § 2401(b) (2).
220. DaFr CoMMrIE REPORT, supra note 14, at 924.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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This formulation bears an interesting relationship to S. l's version
of the insanity defense. In essence, S. 1 abolishes the insanity defense
as it has been developed over the years by courts and commentators.
The statute provides that "mental disease or defect" is a defense only
where, as a result of it, the defendant "lacked the state of mind re-
quired as an element of the offense charged."2' 23 Since any defendant
found to lack the requisite culpability must be acquitted under accepted
principles of criminal law, S. 1 classes the insane with all other defend-
ants in assessing criminal responsibility.
The bill has been sharply criticized for this approach.224 By contrast,
most of the federal appellate courts have adopted a test of insanity sub-
stantially the same as that proposed in the Model Penal Code:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality ... of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.2 25
The italicized phrase is virtually identical with the test for the mitigat-
ing factor of "significant mental impairment" as described in the Draft
Committee Report.s26 The drafters of S. 1, without openly acknowl-
edging what they are doing, have downgraded the insanity defense as
employed by most federal courts to a "mitigating circumstance" which,
though it at least forbids the death penalty, nonetheless allows convic-
tion and imprisonment of people we have been accustomed to think
of as sick rather than criminal.22 7
Moreover, the history of the insanity defense in the American courts
plainly demonstrates that weighing and measuring degrees of mental
defect and/or criminal responsibility is extremely difficult. 8  Describ-
223. S. 1, supra note 8, § 522.
224. See Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 13 ClIM. L. REP. 3265,
3269 (1973).
225. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 5, § 4.01 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Wade v.
United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720,
727 (6th Cir. 1968).
226. See text accompanying note 220 supra.
227. Thus, far from covering "every foreseeable factor that might justify prohibiting
the imposition of the death penalty in a particular case," (DaAFr CoMMrrr-E REPORT,
supra note 14, at 923) S. I's list of mitigating factors barely acknowledges that insane
persons are not appropriate candidates for capital punishment Cf. Polsby, The Death of
Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SuPREME COURT REv. 1, 40:
In nineteenth-century England, it is said that persons found disguised in the public
roads were hanged . . . because anyone who goes abroad in disguise is undoubtedly
up to no good. There is an earthy wisdom in that assumption, and I submit that
it applies as well to ideas as it does to people: when you find them in disguise
in a public place, they are up to no good. Depend upon it.
228. For an epic struggle with the verbal formulation of the insanity test see United
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ing the jury's role in determining criminal responsibility where the
insanity defense has been raised, one federal court implicitly acknowl-
edged that discretion plays a crucial part:
[The jury] measures the extent to which the defendant's mental and
emotional processes and behavior controls were impaired at the time of
the unlawful act.. .. The second [jury] function is to evaluate that
impairment in light of community standards of blameworthiness, to
determine whether the defendant's impairment makes it unjust to hold
him responsible.229
There simply is no way to insure that like cases are treated in like
manner (or arrive at like results) when the jury is assessing such
nebulous concepts as "community standards of blameworthiness" or
seeking to determine what "justice" requires. These are inevitably
matters for the exercise of discretion.
A third mitigating factor under S. 1 is that at the time of the offense,
"the defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not
such duress as would constitute a defense to prosecution[.] ' 230  The
wording of the section is somewhat puzzling since S. 1 elsewhere pro-
vides that duress, though otherwise an "affirmative defense" 2311 to
prosecution under certain circumstances, is not a defense to prosecution
for murder.232 This particular mitigating factor, therefore, applies dif-
ferently to the national security offenses than it does to murder. In
the case of the former, the "duress" involved is obviously less than that
which constitutes a successful duress defense. In the case of the latter,
there is no question of a successful duress defense and the sentencing
body would have to look to the circumstances to determine the amount
of duress under the guidelines given in the Draft Committee Report.
Presumably the amount of duress which would have sustained a
successful duress defense in a national security case should invariably
be sufficient to prove "duress" as a mitigating factor in a murder case.
But the report does not say. It remarks only that the provision "is
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), overruling Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (adopting MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1), supra note
5, as the insanity test in the District of Columbia Circuit); Washington v. United States,
390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
229. United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
230. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2401(b) (3).
231. S. 1 defines an "affirmative defense" as one the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 111.
232. Id. § 531.
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designed to cover those rare situations when a defendant's freedom to
refrain from committing the crimes covered by this chapter is clearly
limited through reasonable fear for his own or another's safety."
233
The core situation involved is plain enough: the defendant is
coerced by threats of imminent serious harm to himself or another.
But, as usual, the specific nature of the factor begins to fuzz around
the edges. How does the sentencing body distinguish a "reasonable"
from an "unreasonable" fear for one's own or another's safety? Should
the unusually timid defendant, who genuinely believes threats which
appear incredible to the safe and reasonable hindsight of the jury, be
a candidate for capital punishment? The determination of what is
"reasonable fear" in such cases will almost inevitably turn on the
judge's or jury's individual peculiarities: their courage or lack of it,
their specific past experiences, their possibly stereotyped notions about
how much fear is "reasonable" for men, on the one hand, or women,
on the other, to feel in certain circumstances. The history of rape law
in America suggests, for example, that many men are completely
unable to assess the fear that many women feel when threatened with
rape. 234 Studies have shown that we are much too willing to accept
low-level domestic violence without recognizing that it may well lead
to serious violence or even murder. 35 Can we, or should we, trust our
perceptions of another person's fear to distinguish the capital defendant
who deserves to die from one who deserves to live?
A fourth mitigating factor is that "the defendant was an accomplice,
the conduct constituting the offense was principally the conduct of
another person, and the defendant's participation was relatively mi-
nor[.]"' 236  The Draft Committee Report leaves no doubt that the
determination of such facts is a matter of discretion: "The judgment
as to what is relatively minor participation will be made on a case by
case basis by the court or jury taking all the relevant facts into
consideration. '' 237 The report explains only that a defendant who
plans and initiates a murder is not a minor participant even if he does
not do the killing himself, and that a defendant "who after killing was
prevailed upon to assist in the escape may well be considered under
233. DRAFt CoMnTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 924.
234. See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 360-67, 373-
74 (1975). See also KALVEN & ZEISEr, supra note 7, at 249-51, 254.
235. See Zimring, The Medium is the Message, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 97 (1972);
Wolfgang, supra note 157.
236. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2401(b)(4).
237. DRAFt Comvrrrnn REoRT, supra note 14, at 924.
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all the circumstances to have had only a minor part."2 88 By traditional
standards of culpability, it should be noted, the latter defendant would
not even be guilty of the murder.28 9 Under S. l's definition of accom-
plice liability, his guilt remains less than certain. The question is
whether or not he "knowingly aid[ed] or abet[ted] the commission
of the offense,"2 40 a finding that itself would depend upon the
individual facts and circumstances. Given the example of Slater v.
State,2 41 in which the trial judge refused to consider whether the
defendant's participation was minor when he had no direct responsibil-
ity for the killing, it appears that arbitrary findings are possible, even
likely, under this mitigating factor as well.
The last mitigating factor included in the most recent version of S.
1 is that the defendant "could not reasonably have foreseen that his
conduct in the course of the murder for which he was convicted would
cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to any person." 4 '
The report's discussion provides no further illumination. 48 Presum-
ably this factor relates only to the second and third kinds of murder
as defined in S. 1-felony-murders and murders in which the defend-
ants conduct causes a death in circumstances "manifesting extreme
indifference to human life. '2 44  Yet on analysis, it seems almost
impossible for this factor to apply to either type of murder. If the cir-
cumstances in fact manifest extreme indifference to life, a defendant
of ordinary mental capacity 245 could hardly fail to foresee that death
might result. Defendants who engaged in one of the serious felonies
listed in the felony-murder section of S. 1246 could scarcely argue that
there was no reasonable possibility of "a grave risk of causing .. .
death to any person." Even if robbers set out with toy guns and not
a single genuine weapon among them, they could reasonably foresee
that the targets of their attack might be frightened into heart attacks,
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., People v. Barclay, 40 Cal. 2d 146, 252 P.2d 321 (1953); People v.
King, 30 Cal. App. 2d 185, 85 P.2d 928 (1938); 54 CAL. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 195, at 643
(assisting defendant after commission of crime does not render the assistant an accom-
plice; an accessory after the fact, in common-law terminology, is not liable as an accom-
plice).
240. S. 1, supra note 8, § 401(a)(1).
241. 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975).
242. S. 1, supra note 8, § 2401 (b) (5).
243. See DRAFT Cormmr=E REPORT, supra note 14, at 924.
244. S. 1, supra note 8, H9 1601(a) (2)-(3).
245. The use of the word "reasonably" indicates that the drafters did not intend the
sentencing body to consider mental impairment as a mitigating factor under this section.
246. S. 1, supra note 8, § 1601(a) (3).
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or into rash and dangerous behavior.247  The circumstances in which
this mitigating factor would actually come into play would almost cer-
tainly be sufficiently peculiar to warrant labeling the sentencing body's
decision "arbitrary" regardless of the penalty imposed. At the very
least, a court or jury speculating about what a defendant could or could
not reasonably have foreseen is deep into uncharted territory and must
exercise discretion in order to make its decision.
VII.
The foregoing discussion has focused on the ways in which the death
penalty sections of S. 1, through the processes they create and the word-
ing they use, fail to remove either discretion or arbitrariness from the
imposition of capital punishment in our legal system. It has been
further suggested that no sentencing processes, and no statutory form-
ulations, can ever successfully confine the decision-maker's choice
closely enough to justify the death penalty. So far the argument has
centered on the judge and the jury, acting as trier of fact, sentencing
authority, or judicial arbiter of the legal rules, as inevitable sources
of discretion in the sentencing decision. But discretion persists
throughout criminal law and procedure. It neither starts nor ends with
the judge or jury.
The following discussion expands on the problems of jury discretion
and briefly notes many other practices, all of them beyond the reach
of the drafters of S. 1, in which discretion operates to preclude the
evenhanded allocation of capital punishment to all of those, and only
those, whom we could fairly describe as most deserving of society's ulti-
mate sanction. 48 Such practices are cumulative in their effect on the
247. Some courts have held a participant in a felony liable for murder for a killing
caused by someone other than another participant in the felony. But see People v.
Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 40Z P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965) (disapproving
People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1959)).
248. Cf. Wechsler, Symposium on Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L.F. 250, 259 (1961):
[The] imposition [of the death penalty] is not and cannot be administered with
even rough equality.....
A rigid legislative definition of the cases where the sentence should be death has
proved to be unworkable in practice, given the infinite variety of circumstances that
attend even the heinous crimes. Therefore, it is inevitable that the jury or the court
be given power to decide whether the punishment should be imposed .... Discre-
tion means, however, that variations are inevitable, depending on the individuals in-
volved, the jury that may be empanelled, the attitude of the press and public and
other accidents of time and place .... Yet most dramatically when life is at stake,
equality is urged to be a most important element of justice.
See generally W. GAYLN, PARTIAL JuSTICE: A STUDY OF Bus IN SENTENcING (1974)
(detailing the discrepancy among judges in sentencing and suggesting that personal
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imposition of capital punishment. Their product is a system in which
death is inflicted, as Justice Stewart observed, upon a random few. 249
Discretion begins with the prosecutor's decision whether or not to
instigate formal charges against a suspect, and, if so, what charge to
bring. The United States Department of Justice has no effective sys-
tem of monitoring discretionary decisions by United States Attorneys
concerning whether or not to prosecute. 250  Nor is there any substantial
judicial check on the executive branch's actions. Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis has described the prosecutor's role in selecting which laws
to enforce and against whom to enforce them.
Even though the many prosecuting powers at all levels of government
obviously vary widely in the extent and manner of confining, structuring,
and checking, the major outlines are almost always governed by a single
set of universally accepted assumptions. The principal assumptions are
that the prosecuting power must of course be discretionary, that statutory
provisions as to what enforcement officers "shall" do may be freely vio-
lated without disapproval from the public or from other officials, that
determinations to prosecute or not to prosecute may be made secretly
without any statement of findings or reasons, that such decisions by a
top prosecutor of a city or county or state usually need not be review-
able by any other administrative authority, and that decisions to prose-
experiences and beliefs inevitably affect the decisions of even the most fair-minded
judges).
249. See Browning, supra note 168, at 661-62; Rosett, Discretion, Severity and
Legality in Criminal Justice, 46 S. CAL. L. Rv. 12, 14-15 (1972). Commenting on
post-Furman state death penalty statutes, many of which are similar to S. 1 in either
listing aggravating and mitigating circumstances or providing allegedly mandatory capital
punishment in certain cases, Browning argues that discretion is not restricted but shifted
to other parts of the criminal justice process. As a result, he predicts, disproportionate
infliction of capital punishment on minorities and poor people will continue.
There is extensive documentation of past discrimination against Blacks in inflicting
the death penalty. See, e.g., WasoN, supra note 155, at 188-89; M. WOLFGANG & B.
COHEN, CRns AND RACE: CONCEPTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 77, 80-81, 85-86 (1970);
Bedau, The Courts, The Constitution and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 201,
214-17; Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960, 19 RtrrGons L. Rv. 1, 18-21,
52-54 (1964); Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted
Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CJm. L., CaxM, & POL. Sci. 301 (1962);
Wolfgang & Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNAlS 119
(May, 1973). A California study indicated that sentencing juries discriminate on a
class basis, in favor of white-collar defendants and against blue-collar defendants. Note,
A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REv.
1297, 1367, 1377-79 (1969). This study found no sentencing bias on the basis of race.
Id. at 1366-79.
250. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1036, 1038-42 (1972).
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cute or not to prosecute are not judicially reviewable for abuse of
discretion.251
Even if the prosecutor decides to charge the suspect, he may select
a lesser, noncapital charge rather than one which carries a possible
death penalty. Under S. 1, where the distinctions between capitally
punishable national security offenses and lesser transgressions, punish-
able only by imprisonment, turn on complex verbal formulations and
undefined terms, the prosecutor is free to select the greater or lesser
charge for any reason or for no reason.252
Federal courts have specifically approved the use of selective
prosecution by the executive branch of government on the basis of
"matters of policy wholly apart from any question of probable cause.
'253
The Nixon Administration's record of prosecuting political dissidents
despite inadequate evidence to support convictions in many cases 25 -
demonstrates that prosecutorial discretion is in fact exercised on such
grounds. But even if federal prosecutors eschew political bias and act
entirely on the basis of enlightened common sense, their decisions
remain arbitrary, subject to no rule of law. Changing this practice ap-
pears practically impossible, as Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. has
noted, since "change would require the condition, contrary to fact and
to possibility, that we know in advance of trial, or even of charge, of
what offense the accused person is actually guilty.
255
The grand jury's ostensible choices in framing an indictment are
similar to those which confront the prosecutor in selecting a charge.
Most grand juries, of course, look to the prosecutor for guidance in
deciding whether and upon what charge to indict. The grand jury is
almost wholly dependent on the prosecutor to produce the evidence on
which its charge must be based. It almost invariably follows his recom-
mendation. The original theory of the grand jury-that it would
provide a community check on the prosecutor's power-has been amply
disproved in practice.2 50
Plea bargaining is another potential source of arbitrariness in the
administration of capital punishment under S. 1. Since up to 90 per-
251. K. DAVIs, DIscREnoNARY JUSTcE: A PRELIMJNARY INQUIRY 188-89 (1971).
252. See Browning, supra note 168, at 680-81.
253. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 926
(1965) (footnote omitted).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (Ist Cir. 1969).
255. BLAcK, supra note 13, at 39.
256. See, e.g., Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10
AM. Clum. L. Rnv. 701 (1972).
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cent of all criminal convictions are obtained on bargained pleas,257
many prospective capital defendants have been, and will continue to
be, removed from the class of candidates for the death penalty by this
process.255 Despite arguments that plea bargaining is unconstitu-
tional,2 59 the Supreme Court has approved the practice and even pro-
vided some guidance in an attempt to insure that the defendant under-
stands the bargain and that the bargain, once made, is honored. 2 0 But
for the most part, plea bargaining is left to the unfettered discretion
of the prosecutor and the defendant's attorney.26 1
The shape that the bargain finally takes-and the prosecutor's
decision whether to offer a bargain at all-depends on factors far
removed from the accused's moral culpability or the "heinousness" of
his alleged offense. The prosecutor usually considers the likelihood of
winning his case on the basis of the capital charge. This in turn
rests on such variables as the credibility of the available witnesses
and the necessity for expert testimony; the amount of public money and
time the trial will swallow up; the defendant's past record; and, perhaps,
political pressures to bring this particular defendant to public trial,
pressures which depend on such factors as his or her notoriety and the
general level of public awareness of and outrage at (or sympathy for)
the crime or the criminal. 2  If the prosecutor decides not to offer a
plea bargain, the defendant has no recourse. He cannot demand judi-
cial review of a decision which may determine, more than any other
decision in the interlocking chain from charging through conviction to
sentencing,26 whether or not he will be punished by death.
Once the case goes to trial, it is subject to all the discretionary diffi-
culties of the factfinding and law-applying process. 264 Under S. 1,
257. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMRUSTnATION OF
Jus=icE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE COuRTs 9 (1967).
258. According to a study of murder indictments from 1956 to 1965 in Massachusetts,
63 percent of those indicted for first-degree murder pleaded guilty to a lesser charge.
Carney & Fuller, A Study of Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases in Massachusetts, 3 SUF-
FOLK . REv. 292, 298 (1969).
259. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1387
(1970).
260. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
261. Professor Black remarks that although the prosecutors role in plea bargaining is
undoubtedly paramount, the defense attorney's advice as to whether to accept or reject a
chance to plead guilty to a noncapital offense also may be crucial. BLACK, supra note
13, at 37-43.
262. See id. at 41.
263. Id. at 42.
264. See, e.g., Browning, supra note 168, at 661, 678-80 (1974); Rosett, Discretion,
Severity and Legality in Criminal Justice, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 12, 16-23 (1972).
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though the defendant may be charged with a Class A national security
offense or a murder, the jury remains free to convict him or her of a
lesser included offense, such as Class B treason or espionage, or man-
slaughter. The jury may recognize some vaguely defined defense
265
as a justification or mitigation of the defendant's actions. It may even
choose to acquit him or her altogether, regardless of whether the evi-
dence is slight or overwhelming. If it does acquit, its decision is not
reviewable because of constitutional guarantees against double jeop-
ardy. 260 The history of capital punishment is replete with such in-
stances of jury nullification.26 7 As Professor Black commented:
This result, like the decision of the prosecutor to accept a plea of guilty
in the plea-bargaining process, sounds good; somebody escapes death.
The trouble is that if you turn the coin around, somebody else suffers
death because the jury did not find him guilty of a lesser offense rather
than of the capital charge. And if the jury's milder verdict may be a
function of its sympathies, then its sterner verdict, by inevitable logic,
may be a function of its lack of sympathy. And it must be remembered
that this alternative, open to the jury, is not effectively controllable, but
may mask any amount of purely "discretionary" decision.
268
Likewise, the jury may, if it wishes, discriminate on the basis of sex
or race. It may discriminate on the basis of the defendant's personal
characteristics-his or her age, status, looks, occupation, political activ-
ity, and so forth. It may choose death or life because it likes or dis-
likes, not the defendant, but his attorney. There is simply no check
on these factors. Yet they seldom, if ever, bear the slightest legitimate
relationship to the defendant's ultimate desserts.
Even after trial, verdict, and sentence of death, the legal system
continues to offer opportunities for the exercise of often standardless
discretion in determining who is to have the sentence carried out and
265. For example, S. 1 establishes two specific defenses to a prosecution for murder. If
the accused is charged with knowingly causing the death of another, he may defend on
the grounds that circumstances for which he was not responsible caused him to lose his
self-control and would be likely to cause an ordinary person to lose his self-control at
least to the same extent. S. 1, supra note 8, § 1601(b). If the defendant is charged
with a felony-murder, it is an affirmative defense that the death was neither a necessary
nor a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the underlying felony or of the particular
circumstances in which the felony was committed. Id. § 1601(c).
266. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
267. See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. Rav.
1099, 1102 n.18 (1953); Mackey, The Inuntility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An
Historical Note, 54 B.U.L. Rlv. 32 (1974).
268. BLAct, supra note 13, at 47.
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who is to escape it. The availability of appellate review and other post-
conviction remedies may depend in large part on the defendant's finan-
cial resources-not just for court and counsel fees but also for further
investigation of his or her case (perhaps in hopes of turning up new
evidence) or even for the influencing of public opinion in his or her
favor.2 69 Despite the limits on appellate review of the death penalty
under S. 1, there is considerable room for an appellate court to shade
the facts or the law in order to avoid the imposition of capital punish-
ment on any particular defendant.27 0 "Clearly erroneous" may sound
like an implacable standard, but Supreme Court Justices have been
known to disagree as to whether lower courts have committed grave
errors or harmless peccadilloes.2 71  Like juries, appellate judges suffer
from "the natural human tendency to see facts and to evaluate evidence
in a manner leading to a desired conclusion .... ,,272
Executive clemency offers a final chance for arbitrariness in the
allocation of capital punishment. The Constitution grants the President
the power to commute death sentences for federal crimes. 273  But it
does not place limits on or provide guidelines for the use of that power.
Perhaps the best-known application for federal clemency in recent
times is that of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. 4  In retrospect, how satis-
fied can we be with the result? Students of executive clemency have
reported that a wide variety of highly discretionary factors influence the
decision in most jurisdictions 275 and that the results are often dis-
269. For a succinct discussion of the ways in which poverty influences the criminal
justice process to the detriment of poor defendants see id. at 84-91. Polsby argues that
the defendants in Furman, who had the assistance of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., and of Professor Amsterdam, could not claim that they had
received inadequate counsel on appeal because of poverty. See Polsby, The Death of
Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUPREME COuRT REv. 1, 13. His
comment ignores the importance of adequate counsel at earlier stages, such as investiga-
tion, pretrial, and trial. Polsby also suggests that if there is no way to prevent jury bias
against defendants of low social status, "what is wanted is a new world, where worldly
advantages do not prove advantageous." Id. What is wanted is a system in which
worldly disadvantages do not become one of the determining differences between life and
death sentences for criminal defendants of differing wealth but similar culpability.
270. See Browning, supra note 168, at 682-83.
271. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
272. See BLACK, supra note 13, at 46.
273. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
274. See L. NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRAcY 454-55, 518-24 (1974).
275. See Lavinsky, Executive Clemency: Study of a Decisional Problem Arising in the
Terminal Stages of the Criminal Process, 42 CHI.-KNT L. REv. 13 (1965); Note,
Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.TJ.L. REv. 136 (1964).
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criminatory in effect.27 6  There is no reason to believe that federal
clemency authority has been or will be exercised with any greater
degree of rationality in the process or certainty in the outcome.
VII.
The persistence of discretion throughout our legal system is inevita-
ble-as inevitable as the persistence of crime. So long as decisions
about crime and punishment are made by human beings about other
human beings, we will never be able to insure completely against bias,
arbitrariness, uncertainty, and mistake. A realistic assessment of our
own limitations is an essential component of any societal decision. But
nowhere is it more important than when we are attempting to distin-
guish those who should live from those who must die. As Justice Ervin
of the Florida Supreme Court wrote, dissenting in State v. Dixon, "All
of us have feet of clay, none of us has all-knowing impeccable judg-
ment; none of us can be exemplars of 'holier than thou' in this matter
of governmentally prescribing life or death for other citizens. 2 7
The focus of this discussion has somewhat obscured the nature of
the national debate over capital punishment. Until the Supreme Court
decision in Furman v. Georgia2 78 turned public attention to the prob-
lems of discretion and arbitrariness, the controversy largely centered on
the deterrent effect of the death penalty: does it or doesn't it prevent
some of us who would otherwise take the law into our hands from
committing violence against others? The statistical evidence against
the theory of deterrence seems overwhelming to many scholars of the
death penalty.21 9 The evidence in favor of the theory is at best
unclear.280  Recent studies, which for the first time have claimed to
prove that deterrence is a social reality, have been much disputed. 81
It seems unlikely that the disagreement over deterrence will be settled
any time soon.
But if we agree that the death penalty is too awesome and final a
sanction to impose unless we have a reasonable assurance that we are
276. Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted
Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. Cnim. L., Cumm. & PoL. Sci. 301 (1962).
277. 283 So. 2d 1, 22 (1973) (Ervin, J., dissenting).
278. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
279. See note 168 supra.
280. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 395 (1972) (Burger, C.., dissenting).
281. See A. voN HntScH, DOING JusTIcE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTs 159 n.7
(1976); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397 (1975).
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doing so only in clear cases, without arbitrariness, without discrimina-
tion on the basis of such constitutionally impermissible factors as race,
sex, or class, then the foregoing discussion may suggest that we do not
have to solve the imponderable riddle of deterrence in order to deter-
mine whether it is time at last to end capital punishment in America.
Once we have acknowledged that discrimination, arbitrariness, and
mistake are inevitable whenever fallible human beings attempt to apply
fallible human rules to the infinity of criminal circumstances possible
in the real world, we have the answer.
